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From: RUSSELL L. ROSS
Date: 10/10/2004
Time: 2:19:37 AM
Remote Name: 64.12.116.18
We Were Soldiers Once and young is FICTION Some simulare characteristics of Lt. Col. Moore and Custer.
When no one wrote about their adventures.
Both wrote their own Book.
Both were Combat Veterans.
Both were considered to be "Flamboyent" by fellow officers. And not well liked.
George Armstrong Custer ( His men called him yellow hair ) Commander of the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry at the battle of the Little Bighorn.
The Indians would wipe the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry out to a man.
Starting the Indian wars, The UNITED STATES would unite and almost wipe out all the Indians taking their lands and putting them on Reservations
LT. Col. Harold G. Moore ( His men called him yellow hair ) Commander 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry at the battle of Landing Zone X-Ray November the 14,1965 Pleiku Provance of South Vietnam.
Lt. Col. Moore's men, With help from the reinforcement's B company 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry.
Saves Landing Zone X-RAY,
Starting the Vietnam war.
Which almost tears the United States apart.
Both Battles ( The Little Bighorn ) and ( Landing Zone X-Ray ) were fought by the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry. On a Sunday, In a Valley, By a River, In tall Grass and near a Large Mountian or Hill top.
Both Commanders were told the size of the enemy troops. By their Scouts.
But didnt belive them.
Scout to Custer "There is a very, very large Indian camp down there."
Custer "Where I dont see any camp".
Page 55 Intelligence Lieutenant to Col. Moore "There is the possibiy of a PAVN Regiment near Landing Zone X-Ray by the Chu Pong mountain.
LT. Col. Moore that didn't really bother me.
Both Of the Commanders wanted to force the Enemy to stand and fight.
As the Enemy's tatics were hit and run.
Both would get their "wish".
Custer was told if he found the Indians he was to wait for the rest of the Army to come.
Lt.Col. Moore was told to stay out of the mountains a Battalion could get lost in there.
Custer in the lead, charges into the valley his troops behind him. Trying to cut off the Indians, So they couldn’t escape on to the plains, and scatter.
Lt. COL. Moore in the lead, charges into the Valley, His troops behind. He would be the first one to set foot on Landing Zone X-Ray, hopeing the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong wouldn't run and excape in to the mountians and into Cambodia.
The Indians and North Vietnamese would send 1,000 or more men out to meet the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry
The Commanders then realized. That their scouts were right. The size of the enemy forces was true.
They were out numbered.
Both battles were defensive. After the initial charge by the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry.
They would pull back, Circle the wagons and let the enemy throw them selves at their defense's.
Their troops Fought Valiantly, even though their Commander had made a major mistake's.
Custer didn’t have fire support, renforcements, It would take weeks to get them.
The 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry was wiped out to the man.
Lt. Col. Moore "I didnt have that problem, I had something Custer didn’t, Fire support, reinforcements"
Lt. Col. Moore's Men through their valor and with the help of the Reinforcements, From the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry.
Save Landing Zone X-Ray.
Starting the Vietrnam War.
It would almost destroy the United States.
I have no access to after action report's.
Lt. Col. Moore, Joseph L. Galloway, The U.S.News and World Report, Will not let me have access to any of their information.
I will be using information from Lt. Col. Moore's book, Using their own stories and other sorces listed below.
The Saturday Evening Post January 28 1967. Pages 80-85 "I Was Ambushed in Vietnam" by Jack P. Smith of ABC NEWS
Sky Soldiers From "The New Face of War" by Time Life Books
Page 37 Lietutenant General Harold G. Moore. "Kinnard began bulding his airmobilty test unit. Training Texts did not exist, and there were no standard operational techneques."
U.S News and World Report October 29,1990 "Fatal Victory." "Vietnam Story."
ARMY FIELD MANUALS
FM 57-35 AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS
FM 22-100 Military Leadership
FM 7-20 Infantry, Airborne Infantry and Mechanized Infantry Battalions
FM 1-100 Army Aviation.
United States Military Academy West Point-New York by LTC Dave Richard Palmer. Readings in current Military History 2. The War in Vietnam 1969. Pages 81-87 The Ia Drang Campaign
FM 23-67 Machinegun 7.62mm M-60
FM 20-60 Battlefield Illumination.
TM 9-1370-201-12 Flare, Aircraft:Parachute, Mk 45.
Marine TIP( J )4 Tactical Employment of the Marine infantry Battalion 1958
FMFM 6-4 Marine Rifle Company/Platoon 1965.
A little about me Russell L Ross
In 1964 I was in the 11 Air Assault Test B company 1st Batalion 511 Infanrty Airborne
B company became B co 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile
I Taught Infantry Tatics which included Air Assault, Mechanized Tatics.
SP/4 RUSSELL L. ROSS
In 1964 I was assinged to the 11 Air Assault Test. My unit was B company 1st Battalion 511 Infantry ( Airborne ) my duty assignement, weapons squad Ammo Bearer. I advanced to Gunner 90MM Recoilless Rifle, M-67 Man portable antitank gun.
In the 11 Air Assualt, We would learn how to use helicopters, Like the Marines. They had used the helicopter in Korea and had good tatics.
We would modify these tatics for the 11 Air Assault's use. The helicopters we would be using was the UH-1D Huey that carried 10 troops and the the CH-47 Chinook helicopter it carried 32 troops.
The Chinook was the origanal troop carrier
One of the key elements of the 11 Air Assault was all the men had to learn how to rappel, Using the swiss seat a 6 foot piece of rope and a snap link, every man carried one plus his gloves it was like his rifle he never went any where out it. We even rappled, Even through the tree's from the hovering helicopters.
We earned our Air Assualt badges by rappeling 5 times from the hovering helicopters.
TROOPS ON MY ORDERS for the 11 AIR ASSAULT WINGS 19 NOVEMBER 1964
Co. B, 1st Bn, 511 Inf
NAMES ARE IN THE ORDER as THEY ARE ON THE ORDERS AYALA, FRANK BEENE, JONAS J BEESLEY, FLOYD M BERG, JACK L BRASSELL, JIM H BOUREGIS, ERROL J CADWELL, DONALD V CARPENTER, SAMUEL D CATES, JAMES R CRUZE, JUAN N DEWESSE, BILLY C FADEN, JAMES R FERRELL-EL, RAYMOND D FOWLER, CLIFTON E GRIFFITH, FRANCES G HARRINGTON, FREDERICK W HUNT, SAMUEL JR JOHNSON, WALTER B KISTNER, VERNON G R LINTHICUM, JAMES T McKINLEY, JOHN P MOSS, RAYMOND E MYERS,MICHALE V NBFACK, JOSEPH J NEWTON, EUGENE W JR NOWELL, ROGER D PEREZ, MANUAL J PETERSON, RICHARD J ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ROSS, RUSSELL L RA 17630469 sp/4 E4 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ SHIPMAN, ROBERTD SHOMAKER, THOMAS G SMITH, DAVID L SNYDER, WILLAM R JR SPRIGEGS, WILLIAM B STANDFILL, JOHN R THOMAS, JAMES
The army could put us any where they needed us. Unlike the Airborne.When we attacked an objective we needed no landing zone.
In the UH-1 series or the huey the pilot seat's is on the right. The British right, he's in charge..
There are two types of assualts the first is
Landing directly on your objective.
The secound is landing away from the objective then assembly and reorganization then attack the objective.
There were three echelons to an Airmobile operation.
Assualt Echelon
Resupply or Following Echelon
Rear Echelon.
In the assualt phase you must put the maximun amount of troops onto the objective to secure the objective
Key personnel are put on different Helicopters of the same serial.
For saftey you don't fire from the helicopter as it's landing or any other time. You don’t want hot brass flying around inside the helicopter. and the troop to your right wouldnt like hot brass in the face.
Depending on what echelon your in. After you serial has landed you quickley disembark the helicopter, move about 15-20 feet get down on one knee to observe the terrain and to check out the situation, If you get fired on then you assault the enemy.
If no fire you now go to clear your assinged sectors to set up a perimeter defence.
The other lifts following, rear echelon, Cant fire as the come into the Landing Zone becouse you dont know where the other troops are.
There is always a defence phase no matter how long you stay on the Landing Zone. and it usaully in the form of a perimeter.
The Huey UH-1D has a weight limit of (4,000 pounds )
Using the space method.
A space is defined by the Army as the weight of a fully combat-equiped trooper 240 pounds.
There is a saftey margIan built in ths estimate. This method can be used for any military aircraft.
The slicks UH-1D ( troop carrier ) can fly at 120 knots, The gunships UH-1B can only fly at 80 knots as the weapons create drag, and agility is lost from all the weight of the ammunition.
After 80 knots you endanger the crew of the gunship and it burn's more fuel.
The refuling and ammo points would be near the troop pick up point. To save time
If these rules were followed the Huey could carry 10 troops.
How vicious was the battle at Landing Zone Albany?
By the amount of Enemy Weapons and Casualties policed up after a battle is a fair indicator.
At Landing Zone Albany 303 Enemy KIA, 268 Enemy weapons
75% were Killed by Rifle and Machinegun fire
25% of the PAVN Killed, Was by Artillary, ARA Rockets and Tac Air.
while At Landing Zone X-RAY 634 Enemy KIA, 1,215 estimated KIA 241 Enemy weapons
75% of the PAVN's Killed. Were Killed by Artillary, ARA Rockets and Tac Air.
25% of the PAVN were killed by Rifle and Machine gun fire.
When the Battle started at Landing Zone Albany the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry lead units( A co and attached Recon Platoon )were stopped at Landing Zone Albany on the farside. The rest of the column was moving up to Albany to set up the perimeter.
Lt. Col. McDade had called his Company Commanders foward to show them the area's they were to defend.
Reorganization This is the time a unit is most venerable
Years later the men from the 2 Battalion 7th Cavalry not looking to LT. Col. McDade and their own success at Landing Zone Albany ( by defeating a reinforced regiment.)This is after a Forced March, Carrying extra equipement left by the 1/7 at Landing Zone X-Ray. The Battle started just 20 minutes after they reached Landing Zone Albany
The ability of an infantry soldier to fight is directly related to the load he is required to carry. Excessive loads cost soldiers their energy and agility.
IF PEOPLE STILL WANT TO CALL ALBANY AN AMBUSH, which it was not
THEN THEY MUST GIVE THE 2ND BATTALION 7TH CAVALRY THE CREDIT FOR BREAKING THE AMBUSH, AND INFLICTING 2 TIMES THE CASAULTIES ON THE AMBUSHERS.
Turned to Lt. Col. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway who told them that their Battalion Commander Lt.Col McDade, and Brigade commander Col. Brown let them down.
Joseph L. Galloway HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, TRAINING AT ALL.
Joseph L. Galloway writes in 1991 in a letter to me
"ALBANY was a Disaster, A Failure of their Battalion Commander Lt. Col. McDade a "NOVICE" and also on the part of the 3rd Brigade Commander Col. Brown.
Who delayed reporting the size of the fight to Division Headquerters for some 18 hours As A consequence, Rienforcements were not sent.
Strange last statement as reinfofcements were sent that nite around 6:00pm
The same amount of time it took Landing Zone X-Ray to get reinforcements around 5:00 pm
When the whole time Lt. Col. Moore's "incompetence" as a Battalion Commander was the cause of their delemma.
Lt. Col. Moore UNDER THE DELSION he was rewriting Air Mobile tatics, indoing so he doomed his men and the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry.
In the Battle of Landing Zone X-Ray the Division Commander Kinnard would commit the Division to keep Lt. Col. Moore from losing Landing Zone X-Ray.
Kinnard "I violated a lot of priniples about how hard you work your guy's and how many hour's you fly your helicopters.
"I literally flew the Blades off the choppers."
The Artillary, Helicopters and their crews would expend them selves.
This in turn would lead to the 2 Battalion 5 Cavalry and the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry and attached unit A company 1st Battalion 5th Cavalry
To have to walk out of Landing Zone X-Ray, as they the ( Huey's and Artillary )were down for maintanance.
LANDING ZONE ALBANY
Early in the morning of November the 14,1965, The Recon platoon. (loneranger call sign) of D compamy 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry of the 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile flew out of An Khe base camp by Huey. On that morning to patrol an area around Pleiku provance.
I'm an RTO for this patrol. We landed and started
We came to a river to large to cross, We walked along the edge which would disappear and we would be in water up our waist. We came to a feeder stream and went up it. We came to an area that was all brown. It was a large area the grass and leaves were all dead, The standing water puddles had an oily sheen floating on top of them.
While in the area we found a dead PAVN he was young, he had a hole in his head on the right side just above his eye brow you could see his brain, he was searched and then we dragged him to some bushes and covered him with brush.
We continued the patrol.
Around 1200hrs the Platoon Leaders RTO said that the 1st Battaliuon 7th Cavalry had hit a hot Landing Zone he listen every now and then to the battle, They were calling for reinforcements. We said we were ready to go in, we were close but the call came back platoons to small they need company's. So we finished our patrol, That evening we Lifted out of another Landing Zone and flew back to An Khe and relived somr Troops that was on the green line. We continued to listen to the battle.
November 15 1965. On the green line. Still listning to the battle. Around 1700hrs the 1st and 2nd squads are realived the 2nd Battalion will be going to Pleiku and then on to reinforce the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry at Landing Zone X-Ray on the 16 of November. There isn't enough helicopters to take the whole Battalion, so the 3rd and 4th squads will stay on the green line till they are called for.
November 16 1965 , still on green line around 1600hrs, we are relived from the green line we are told that we would be flying in to Landing Zone X-Ray the next morning, We go to the company area and get some sleep. On November the 17 1965 About 0800 hrs we leave the company and head for the hueys for our flight into Landing Zone X-Ray.
As we start to land It doesnt look like a battle had been fought here. We touch down exited the Huey and moved 15-20 feet and got down on one knee. There were two shots fired to our front, we get in the prone position The hueys leave, we can't fire as we are not on the parimeter. Some one comes from the tree line at our left rear and yells at us to get off of the Landing Zone we run forward and came to a creek. it was empty, There were some troops there.
We are told that the B-52 are supposed to bomb landing zone X-Ray around noon and we must to be 3 miles away. We have to walk, strange we just get to the Landing Zone and we now are walking to another one, I wonder why didn’t they fly us to the new landing zone, We learn why.
We are walking because of the battle of Landing Zone X-Ray, They had the Helicopters in constant use.
The crewchief's had no time to pull maintenance on them.
The same with the artillary, As Lt. Col. Moore had them firing all the time.
We have no support at all, we are on our own.
And the reason we werent flown to the new Landing Zone Albany. The Recon Platoon is going to operate as a Rifle Rlatoon for A co. As we move out we passed by Lt. Col. McDade he is looking at a map his RTO's around him. We move into the elephant grass.
We are coming as we come out of the elephant grass and cross a small stream ( a trickle ) tree's are to our right. Lt. Col. McDade and the command group are 25 feet behind. The clearing is shaped like a half elips 115 yards long and about 75 yards wide the elephant grass is to our left and the tree line is to our right, its slightly rockey and has sparce tufs of grass.
The Sgt.Major Is carried a poncho that some one has lost. We find some M-79 ammo Lt. Col. McDade wonders if some one is incidentally dropping ammo he walks over to me a Recon RTO, Lt. Col. McDade wants to use the radio. I give McDade the hand set, I stoop over Lt. Col. McDade now changes the frequency to battallion net.
Lt. Col. McDade tell's the company commander to have the men check their equipement, He dosent want to find any more equipement or ammo.
While on battalion net the Recon Platoon Leader call's Lt. Col. McDade they have captured two PAVN, We are only 75 yards from them I take back the hand set and stoop over Lt. Col. McDade changes the frequency back to the Recon frequency It only takes us 5 minutes for the group to get to where the captured PAVN are, There was no command given to stop moving.
While McDade is questioning the prisoners other troops are passing us, Landing Zone Albany is only about 65-75 yards ahead off to our left, There is a slight trail you can see the Landing Zone from where we are.
Ackerman tell's me how they captured the PAVN, He said that he had stepped into the bush to take a leak and found them laying on their backs, They had no idea we were there.
He said that he wanted the SKS from the prsioner that he had captured. We were there for a short period of time, I'm still near Lt. Col. McDade he come over to me to use the radio again. Its only about 15-20 minutes.
After using it he tells us to move on to Landing Zone so I move with the P.O.W. group.
The P.O.W. group stops at the edge of Landing Zone Albany it was only a 5 to 6 minute walk, The Landing Zone is shaped like an apes right foot.
Off to our left front some one is talking on a radio they are in a small finger of trees and troops are an the far side of the Landing Zone in the tree line.
As we are standing there I look at the SKS of one the P.O.W's, Were only there for a couple of minutes I only open the bolt, There are 2 shots fired of to our left front, I lay the SKS down by the P.O.W group and then I run to the far side of the Landing Zone where the other Troops are.
As I reach the far side of the Landing Zone and get in the prone position with the other troops that were there.
There is roar as the small arms from both sides open up, Everone is firing at the enemy and the frindley troops that are to our rear on the small finger of trees are firing over us a lot of round hit among us. We recivied a few M79 and M-16 but the M-60 Gunner must have used his basic load,
How long the attack lasted is unknown we keep firing till they came no more, in some places there was some hand to hand.
After the firing stopped and it go quite.I called on the radio that this was the Recon platoon Dammet and we were holding down the far side of the Landing Zone and we were receiving friendly fire from our rear M-60, M-79 and M16's They ok the transmission,
2 or 3 secounds later they called me back and tell me I am to tell everone to pull back to the finger, I then tell the troops to my left and right that we were ordered to pull back and to pass it on. Some troops were in a crouch position and was pulling back.
There was some one standing up in the finger and directing the troop to come that way, some of us stayed to cover them,
Then we hear a airplane to our rear the engine sounded very well tuned.
All of sudden it started to sound like it had blew a rod tika tika tika tika tika. The Pilot was firing the 20mm as he passed over us.
We didn’t wait any more, We all got up, You could smell the gun powder and the area was in a white fog produced from all the firing.
We ran back to the finger as we got down in the prone positition facing the area where we had been. Black smoke was drifting in our direction apprently it has also dropped naplam, It was coming from where our right flank had held, now the pilot had fired and dropped naplam on our troops that had held that portion of the far side of the Landing zone,
The Landing Zone on the far side is no longer secure. It would remain unsecure till the next morning.
Then it came and hit the back side (where the POW group had stopped) of the Landing Zone, Where we walked on the trail to get here, It made two or three passes there. You could feel the heat of the napalm as it burned.
After the plane left we started to dig in we were on the finger of trees and the wounded and other troops started to come the finger, They came from the far side right flank where the Aircraft first hit. We stood up and waved to them so they came to us the majority were the walking wounded.
We went out to meet them, I took ammo from some of them until my ammo pouches were full again, other troops did also.
After we gave some of them first aid We then sent them to the command post area. Recon had some enemy weapons ( RPD's ) they had picked up as we left the farside.
Recon then voluntered to go back through the column. To look for other troops, But we were told no, The situation was still too volatile and the enemy might attack again. As we had a perimeter. And there were no troops to cover the area we were defending.
After a while someone came around and was asking for water for the wounded, I took a drink and gave both my canteens to him.
We contunied to dig in, Recon has good fields of fire we have the landing Zone to fire over. The other troops have knee high grass and trees in their fields of fire.
Some one comes around and tell's us the pass word for the nite is Garry Owen the counter sign is Garry Owen.
Around dusk some Huey's land off to our left, The left door gunners (co pilots) side of the Huey fire into the area, On the far side of the Landing Zone that we had held and repelled the attackers.
There is no return fire as they land and leave, all the troops exit the helicopters from the right side, They only have to go 35-40 meters to run and they were inside the perimeter.
We are still in the finger of trees and don’t have to move to make room for the reinforcements.
The reinforcement is our B company, We found out they had spent the day in Pleiku, In the bars with the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry troops.
But it was nice to get renforcements.
Lt. Col. Moore who had been listening to the battle of Landing Zone Albany on the radio voluntered for the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry to go to Columbus to guard the artillary, So the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry could go and reinforce ALBANY,
Some Officers even Kinnard stated that Col. Moore voluntered to go into ALBANY but he didn’t.
and from Persons in the book That Moore and Galloway write good about give in return and addes to the MYTHS
One Reporter Bob Poos writes that COL. Moore and the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry was the ones who relived the Plie me camp, Soldier of Fortune March 83 page 29-30 ARVN AMBUSH 3rd column last 2 paragraphs Plie Me did get relief- with a vengeance- from the 1st Cavalry Division. Through a strange coincidance, the camp commander, Capt Harold Moore, Learned later that much of the relief force was commanded by a name sake, Lt. Col. Harold Moore commander of the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry, When in fact it was my old unit the 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry.
Capt George Forrest when he spoke to the Old Guard said Lt. Col. Moore was there in 1963
So starts the myths about Col.Moore and the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry,
Lt. Col. Moore idea would cost time becouse the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry would have to be to Columbus 4 hours, Then the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry would have to be flown to Albany another 4 hours. 8 hours to renforce Albany?
So why didn’t Kinnard sent the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry to reinforce ALBANY?
They were probally to drunk?
The night goes fine we don’t recive any more fire nor are we attacked , there is an ocasional flare to light up the night.
Some time during the night there were two mad minutes, started by some one on the left rear of the perimeter. On the secound one Lt. Col. McDade called the companies and said the next person to fire better have a body or they would be court martialed, it is quite the rest of the night.
November the 18, 1965 Landing Zone Albany
In the morning Lt. Col. McDade tell's everyone to get ready to fire a mad minute, and then to move out and clear the area to the front, Recon call's back and asks if they can fire the captured enemy weapons, Lt. Col. McDade say no.
We all fire and move out on line. There is a lot of dead enemy, first aid gear, where they had tried bandage them selves, As we move past the dead PAVN, One of them starts to move two of the guys grab him and drag him with us to the end of the Landing Zone.
When we stop the Landing Zone is now secure again, The PAVN dies 5 minutes later. There are some shots fired Lt. Col. McDade call's and said there better be fresh bodies, or else you are in trouble..There is no more firing in the sector or anywhere else.
Recon is on security most of the morning. When we come back there is a line of enemy weapons laid out, Everone is looking at the enemy weapons and equipement. I go to the pile of equipement ( Americian )and pick out two canteens to replace the ones I gave for the wounded.
They still have water in them and I take a drink.
A reporter has come in with B company 2/7 the night of the 17, Why he was allowed to come with the reinforcemen's is unknown, another trooper, ammo, or water or even first aid equipement could have been brought.
His name was Rick Merron of the Associated Press, In the morning he took pictures and headed back to the Landing Zone to get a ride back so he could send his story and pictures state side.
A helicopter was there loaded with wounded and was getting ready to leave there was one space left.
He got on board the Helicopter, and then a wounded trooper was brought to the helicopter.
They ask Merron to get of so the wounded trooper could be put on board, but merron wasnt about to give up his seat.
A Officer came up and ask what the problem was, The troops told him, He went over and ask Merron to get out, So the wounded trooper could be placed on board and again Merron refused, he ask again, another refuesal.
The Officer then takes out his pistol cocked it and put it on Merron head and told him if he didn’t get his ass out of the heliocpter in the next minute, he Merron would go out later with the Dead, Only then did he Merron get out of the helicopter.
GUESS WHO STARTED THE RUMOR THAT LANDING ZONE ALBANY WAS AN AMBUSH.
MERRON OF COURSE.
That evening the Recon platoon saddled up they were being sent to another Landing Zone. It was an artillary Landing Zone ( Crook I think ) for security duty. When we got there foxholes were already dug. I was still jumpy and jumped at just about every sound out side the perimeter. The next morning the other securty forces said that they almost took our weapons away from us. so I guess I wasnt the only one But again the other troops hadnt been an any battles, and to us any sound could be danger. I found my foxhole was under the trajectory of the 81mm mortars. As they fired the bore riding saftey plunger would fall through the trees and to the ground to my front.
19 November 1965
The Recon platoon is taken back to Brigade Headquarters, There are hot showers and new fatuge's for some, They didnt have all sizes. We are loaded on 5 ton simi trucks flat bed with siding every one is standing up and we are on our way back to An Khe base camp.
We are more worried now then when we flew into Landing Zone X Ray
When we get back we unload, A medical team is there and we must give a sample of blood, We go back to the company area. About a week later the Recon platoon is told that 90% have malaria and are sent to Qui Nhon to the medical facility, there they take a blood sample ever day. I think we were there for two weeks.
While we were at the hospital, one morning there is one lone 5 ton simi trailer loaded with lumber and its going to An Khe and it will return that evening. I'm sent as a guard, and while I'm there I'm to pick up Recons mail, The trip is made with out any problems.
No one is showing signs of malaria, but Robert and my self do get sick. my right jaw swells up and they say it the mumps. We stay one week longer then the rest of Recon Platoon.
Next Bon Son
NOTE COL. MOORE IS NOW THE 3RD BRIGADE COMMANDER AND LT. COL. McDADE IS UNDER HIS COMMAND.
We go to the Airfield to load C-123's to fly to Bon Son, Col. Moore stuffes the C123's with the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry, As there is only a few Aircraft, He loads them so full, when we get on board about 15 of us troops are standing on the ramp as they close it.
The Crew Chief tell us to go back in to the tail to help the pilot to get the nose up, we take off and get airborne. The crew cheif then tell's us to come back down from the tail.
The Plane that take off before we do goes down.
The plane went up ok, But then went into a nose dive at 45% degree angel,It never recovered.
Did the plane lose it balance? No one will ever know. The entire plane burned except for some parts like the landing gear. No one survived
Col. Moore would use the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry as his whipping boys ( WHICH NOW IS ONLY ABOUT 25% COMBAT VETERANS, THE OTHER 75% IS REPLACEMENTS FRESH FROM THE STATES ) to start his campain, DURING "MASHER,WHITE WING" Col. Moore would send the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry into "MORE" Landing Zones during the campain then the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry and the attached units.
He would send them in to the crachin Rain.
Without Air and Artillary support, Col. Moore has decided he dosent want civilians hurt or killed in the campain's opening Assault,( Col. Moore had seen a wounded girl and he thought of his own daughter who was about the same age, SO NO PREP OF THE LANDING ZONES )
the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry is sent into a Landing Zone without any preparation ( LZ 4 ),
The Landing Zone is ringed with a Battalion of dug in PAVN troops. ( Over 700 men )with Bunkers and connected with covered trench's in some places. A force this size would require an attack force of 2,100 troop to over come a 7-1 ratio
The 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry aproximatly 600 troops.
This is one of the things an Air Assault Force isnt desinged to to attack. A heavely fortified position.
From "The Vietnam Experience A Contagion of War Pager 32-48
Col. Moore was furious. His D-day offensive had bogged down in the white sands of LZ4, and he'd seen no effective maneuver to regroup Company C and attack the enemy, He raised Lt. Col. McDade on the radio. "I told him in no uncretian terms to get that landing zone cleared up, get that Battalion organized, and get moving," Col. Moore said "I let him know I was Very displeased with what was going on."
The next morning it is clear, "now" Col. Moore has Tac Air and the artillary destroy the area east of the landing zone
Col. Moore and Plumbly land in a nearby paddy and leads the reinforcements the 2nd Battalion 12th Cavalry 200 troops to LZ4.
Col. Moore talks to Lt. Col. McDade, He then starts moving around the battle field under fire and starts organizing the troops for an attack on the enemy positions,
"You cant do your job sitting in a damn trench" snapped Col. Moore.
" The old man wasent pleased," Plumbly recounted. The biggest thing they needed was "Leadership" and "guidance" to get them out of there." This statement is from the CSM who at Landing Zone X-Ray tell's Lt. Col. Moore as the battle started, to get down becouse if he goes down (gets killed )they will all go down (die)
Col. Moore with bayonet fixed on his rifle, as the last rounds hit the enemy positions now LEAD's the 2nd Battalion 12 Cavalry, and CHARGES the fortified enemy positions.
( What he wouldnt and didnt give to Lt. Col. McDade )
THE ENEMY FORCES WHICH NOW ONLY CONTAIN A PLATOON,( 30-40 troops )a Rear guard. THE ENEMY HAS LEFT THE AREA DURING THE NIGHT, it is easlly defeated by the charge
THE BATTLE OF LZ4 IS JUST LIKE AP BAC.
Col. Has made no attempt to encircle or block the enemy, during the battle.
AS YOU can SEE COL. MOORE IS A PISS POOR LEADER,
WOULD MOORE BE A "GENERAL". NOW?
WHAT IF!! COL. BROWN HAD COME INTO LANDING ZONE X-RAY ON 14, NOVEMBER 1965 AND TOOK OVER THE COMMAND OF Lt. Col. MOORES BATTALION, TELLING HIM THE SAME THING'S, HE HAS JUST TOLD TO Lt. Col.McDADE?
WHAT IF COL. BROWN HADNT GIVEN HIM Lt. Col. MOORE ARTILLARY,TAC AIR and gunships? AS HE Col. Moore DIDnt give TO Lt. Col. McDade at LZ4
what if Col. Brown Leading the reinforcements came into Landing Zone X-Ray telling Lt. Col. Moore to GET YOUR ASS OFF OF THIS LANDING ZONE!!!, YOU CANT DO YOUR JOB SITTING IN A GODDAMD FOXHOLE, YOUR MEN NEED LEADERSHIP, HE WAS VERY DISPLEASED WITH WHAT WAS GOING ON." then using the Artillary, tac air, and gunships, lead's the counter attack.
COL. MOORE'S LEADERSHIP IS THE SAME AS AT LANDING ZONE X-RAY AS IT IS LZ4.
VERY PISS POOR
he wont give you the necceary gear, equipement to do the job he want you do do, but he sure uses it to make him self look good!!and you the loser.
"HE" IS THE ONLY ONE WHO CAN DO THE JOB.
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY:
No one expects the "BRIGADE COMMANDER" to act as a rifleman no matter how proficient he is.
As he does so,
Who commands his BRIGADE?
Who gives guidance to his BATTALION COMMANDERS?
He is taking responsibility away from his men and not meeting his own.
Leadership Principle 9
Develop a sense of Responsibility in your subordianates
Delegation of authority commensurate with responsibility developes mutual confidenece and respect between senior and subordinates.
It also encourages the subordinate to exercise initiative and to give wholeharted cooperation.
The leader who, by properly delegating authority, demomstrates faith in his subordinates will increse their desire to accept greater responsibility.
FAILURE TO DELEGATE NECESSARY AUTHORITY IS POOR LEADERSHIP
at Landing Zone X-Ray Page 31 November the 9th, LT. Col. Moore "We Shuttled the Battalion in on 16 Hueys, Plumbly and I Landed with the first elements of Capt. Tony Nadal's A company.
Page 40 November the 14 Lt. Col. Moore "I personally to influence the action would be in the 1st Huey to land, On Landing Zone X-Ray."
Page 60 Lt. Col. Moore leading his command group clear a sector of Landing Zone X-Ray, On the way back to the Landing Zone, Meets the troops who were suppose to clear that sector.
Page 73 When the Battle started Lt. Col. Moore "I was tempted to join A or C company's men"
Who would be in charge? What would the Company commanders do?
Page 108 Lt. Col. Moore "Matt and Mickey had! controlled all flights into X-Ray."
"I then took Control,"
Every Huey coming to Landing Zone X-Ray must radio "Me" for landing instructions."
Page 109 Crandall "Lt. Col. Moore was now a signalman at the far end of the Landing Zone was standing up, directing us where to land."
Page 109 The 3rd Brigade Commander( Col. Brown )had given Lt. Col. Moore pathfinders
Page 195 Lt. Col. Moore I personally lead the final counterattack to make certian that the Company Commander ( Diduryk ) of Bco 2/7 & his men did a safe, clean, job and to look for my Missing Troops.
Page 58 Lt. Col. Moore didnt bring in his Execuitive Officer Wirth ( 2nd in command ) to help run the battalion command post.
Lt. Col. Moore "The Battalion Rear Command Post was run by my Executive Officer Major Wirth".
The XO was supose to be in the Main Command Post with Moore
Beckwith's Delta teams were sent out at the same time. Col. Moore tell's Beckwith if he find's the enemy he will come and wipe them out, Beckwith does find the enemy, But Col. Moore has also found the enemy at LZ4, He cant help Beckwith, Beckwith loses some of his Delta teams, Beckwith him self, trying to save his teams, is wounded in the stomach by a 50 cal, he bearley survives.
TROOPS ON MY COMBAT INFANTRY BADGE ORDERS OCT 28 1965 Co D 2d Bn 7th Cav
2 PAGES NAMES ARE IN THE ORDER as THEY ARE ON THE ORDERS PAGE 1 THORP, HENERY B JR KALLA, MICHALE A LAWRENCE, JAMES T GROVE, GORDON A BOWEN, LORANSIA D ATKINS, JOHNNIE E BAKER, GARRY C BENTON, RONALD H FRAZER, WANNIE L HALL, RICHARD M KNAPP, MARTIAN C SEEFURTH, RAYMOND R VELDEZ, JOSE AMODIAS,OSVALDO BAEZA, MIGULE A BAGGAGO, DOMINDOR A BLANKENSHIP, DENCIL R CASTLE, KESSE O CONNER, JOHN H JR CREED, BERNARD J ERVIN, JAMES W GORNS, EARL B JR MONSEWICZ, LLOYD J OWEN, LARRY L PAREDES, ISMAEL J SHIPMAN, HARVEY E SLOVAK, DONALD J STEELE, WILLIAMS D STRICKLAND, RONALD E TYLER, EARTHELL VINLUAN, DOMINGO B WHITENER, JOHN C YOUNG, WOWARD D JR ACKERMAN, RICHARD R BRIGHT, KENNETH M BUTLER, CLARENCE E BYRANT, WILLIAMS CARMACK, ROBERT L EDDY, KYLE F FADEN, JAMES R JACKSON, DEAN A FIORELLA, LOUIS F JR JOLLEY, BRYANT A HEMINGWAY, WOODROW JONES, MELVIN H KESSINGER, JOHN R LORANCE,A D MARTELL, STANLEY A MARTINEZ, ALFONSE
PAGE 2 MOODY, THOMAS H PARKER, TROY H RIPLEY, BRIAN D RIZK, MICHAEL A ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ROSS, RUSSELL L RA 17 630 469 SP/4 E4 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ RUSE, KENNETH R SMITEN, JAMES L SNIPES, FORREST W STEINER,WILLIAMS J TAPA, PETER G TOWLES, ROBERT L ALTMAN, RAYMOND E BECKER, LISTER E BELLEINA, DONALD A BRATLAND, JOHN C BROWN, RALPH W CARTER, A C JR COHENS, LAWRENCE E CRANE, DONALD E CUFFIE, DAVID P DAVIS, DALTON G DOCET, PERCY J ELLER, CHARLES L FERRER, TORRES A GREEN, WILFRED GUSTAFSON, WILLARD F HALL, ROBERT J HANSON, CHRIS A HERNANDEZ, RAYMOND C HERIAUD, FREDERICK C JEFFRIES, RICHARD D
Part Fiction We Were Soldiers Once and Young X-Ray Part FICTION:
Fabarication applies particulary to a false but carefully invented statement or a series of statements, in which some truth is sometimes interwoven, the whole usually intended to deceive.
"The Greatest Hero"
"People everywhere are smitten- With a tale that is written. Once a hero's deeds are known- They're as good as etched in stone. Every word, folks take to heart- And think this makes them very smart. Amazing how the very wise- Never stop to realize- That what they read may not be true. Groo
MORAL: Even when the words are true, They may not speak the truh. Groo
Part Fiction We Were Soldiers Once and Young, Landing Zone X-Ray part.
The story lacks in techincal, Airmobile, Infantry tatics, and Leadership.
This is the 5th rewriting of this story, By Joseph L. Galloway.
The original story by Joseph L. Galloway was in a Military magazine like Soldier of Fortune. I threw this one away when I was in one of my moods of anger.
The secound one was in Soldier Of Fortune September 1983, "IF YOU WANT A GOOD FIGHT by Joseph L. Galloway.
The third one was in the U.S. News and World Report October 29,1990, "Vietnam Story" by Joseph L. Galloway
The 4 was in Medal OF Honor by the U.S News and World Report Vietnam Story
The Book is the 5th in the series
PREFACE Custers Luck by Edgar I. Stewart
The accounts may create heat in this case since heat is necessary to separate the true metal from the dross.
Whether the problem be one of metallurgy or historical research.
THE ACCOUNTS OF SOME OF THE SOLDIERS WHO SURVIVED ARE ALSO OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF FORGETTFULNESS AND RATINALAZITION .
AS A RESUALT OF THESE DISAGREMENTS, MANY OF THE DETAILES OF THE BATTLES HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN PEREMATLEY OBSCURED AND WILL NEVER BE RECOVERED.
MUCH OF THE WRITINGS THAT DO EXIST IS SO CONTIDICTORY TO THE ACCOUNTS OF THE PARTIPANTS AND EYEWITNESS.
EXACTLY WHAT DID HAPPEN AND WHAT DID NOT.
MANY STORIES WHICH WERE TOLD QUITE SIMPLY WERE LATER ELABORATED IN DETAIL,
SOME OF IT QUITE FANCFUL WHILE OTHERS PARTS WERE UNDOUBTLY TRUE AS DETALES FORGOTTEN. RECURED TO MIND. MEMORY PLAYS STRANGE TRICKS AT TIMES AND THEN THERE IS VERY HUMAN LOVE OF NOTORIETY, WHITCH OFTEN CAUSES THOSE WHO TELL A STORY TO TELL IT IN THE MOST SENSATIONAL MANNER POSSIBLE.
LIPS WERE SEALED FIRST BY A SENSE OF GALLANTRY AND MUCH THAT COULD HAVE BEEN TOLD WAS NOT, SOME OF IT OUT OF LOYALTY TO THE BATTALION AND TO BROTHER OFFICERS , AND TROOPS.
VIETNAM VETERANS HAVE A HIGH DEATH RATE AND WHAT INFORMATION THEY HAD DIED WITH THEM.
The testimony of the PAVN Officers who were present does need to be used with caution: They were interested parties and many of their stories were told at the time the war was over and they had won?
FACTS PRESENTED ALONG WITH VIRTUES AND MINOR SLIPS AND ABERRATIONS MUST BE FAITHFULL AND REPORTED WHEN THEY AFFECT HISTORY.
Fiction only to Lt. Col. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, Jack P. Smith of ABC NEWS, Vincent Cantu and Captian George Forrest Commander of A company 1st Battalion 5th Cavalry, only to what he said in The Video "They Were Young and Brave" and the speech he gave to the "Old Guard"
The other Enlisted men, Junior Officers and the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry, B company 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry, 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry stories cannot be disputed.
Also part Fiction the Video's
The Were Young and Brave by Forrest Sawyer ABC NEWS ( Day One )
Synopsis:
ABC Television "Day One" Documentary
Misc pictures from the Day One trip
After reading the book in 1993, ABC officials decided to produce a television piece for the "Day One" Monday night show hosted by Forrest Sawyer.
During the summer of 1993, ABC inteviewed several veterans of the Ia Drang battles in New York. In October '93, the Ia Drang Veterans, Forrest Sawyer, Terry Wrong (Producer), Quyen Thai (Asst. Producer), and two 2-person TV crews flew to Vietnam.
The veterans are listed below. Included are their military ranks, duty positions, and Ia Drang Battlefields they fought on:
PFC Jack Smith Rifleman, C/2/7 CAV X-Ray, Albany 1LT Larry Gwin XO, A/2/7 CAV X-Ray, Albany CPT George Forrest CO, A/1/5 CAV X-Ray, Albany Joe Galloway UPI Correspondent X-Ray SP4 Bill Beck Machine Gunner, A/1/7 CAV X-Ray CSM Basil Plumley Bn Sgt Maj, 1/7 CAV X-Ray CPT Tony Nadal CO, A/1/7 CAV X-Ray CPT John Herren CO, B/1/7 CAV X-Ray SGT Ernie Savage Squad Leader, B/1/7 CAV X-Ray LTC Hal Moore CO, 1/7 CAV X-Ray MAJ Bruce Crandall CO, A/229th Huey Bn X-Ray
In Hanoi, the veterans met for two hours with Lt. Gen Nguyen Hau An, PAVN Battlefield Commander and five PAVN Colonels who were in the Ia Drang Battles as Lts or Captains. They are:
COL Lo Khac Tam Platoon Leader, 7th Bn, 66th Regiment COL Tran Manh Hao Operations Officer, 66th Regiment COL Vu Dinh Thuoc Rifle Co Cdr, 7th Bn, 66th Regiment COL Nguyen Khac Vien Hvy Wpns Plt Ldr, 7th Bn, 66th Regiment COL Vu Thai Communications Officer, 66th Regiment
(Note: Lt Gen An died in early 1995)
These discussions were all filmed by ABC.
The next day, the Americans, along with Lt. Gen An, Colonels Thuoc and Hao, Vu Binh (escort officer and interpreter, Foreign Press Office), and other Vietnamese officials traveled by air south to Da Nang thence by vans to Qui Nhon. Fred Rohrbach, a 173rd Airborne Vietnam Veteran - with years of business experience in Vietnam, joined the group in Hanoi.
After overnight in Qui Nhon, travel by vans to An Khe, former base camp of the 1st Cavalry Division from 1965-1969, for a short visit; thence over Mang Yang Pass on Route 19 to Pleiku City.
On Oct 17th, the group shuttled into LZ X-Ray (2 lifts) in a Soviet-built MI-8 helicopter piloted by two PAVN officers. Filming was conducted. In the late afternoon, the helicopter returned with the 1st lift back to Pleiku (37 miles). Before it can return for the rest of the group, clouds close in. This, plus rapidly approaching dusk and heavy monsoon rains shut down further flights. The group left in X-Ray for the night included: Sawyer Wong the 2 ABC TV Teams* Galloway Beck Forrest Gwin Moore Vu Binh (Foreign Press Center, Hanoi) Nguyen van Manh (Peoples Cte, Gai Lai Province)
* Minh Van Dong, Bruce Renwick, Bill McMillin, Tom Levy.
The next morning, the helicopter returned and carries the group - along with Jack Smith - to LZ Albany for filming. On the night of October 18th, the entire Vietnamese/American group ate dinner together. During the dinner, Col Hao read a poem about the Ia Drang trip.
The one hour documentary entitled "They Were Young And Brave", aired on January 10, 1994 to very favorable reviews. It aired again in June '94. Copies of the documentary are available from 1-800-913-3434. The tape is item number DY50629A, location number C.13.A.A.01, "They Were Young And Brave".
Vietnam the Soldiers Story by Jack P. Smith ABC NEWS. of the 3 part Video only Tape one Ambushed Death in the Ia Drang Valley is part Fiction.
I cant comment on the Khe Sanh, As I wasent there But I was there for Battles of the Ia Drang Valley
Saturday Evening Post January 28,1967 Pages 80-85 "I was Ambushed in Vietnam" Death in the Ia Drang Valley by Jack P. Smith of ABC NEWS
PAGE REFERENCES ARE FROM THE HARDBACK
Of We Were Soldiers once and Young
The most outrageous LIE
Page 287 At Landing Zone Albany. There on the dying enemy soldier something shiny. A big battered old French army Bugle.
FACT: This Bugle was captured at Landing Zone X-Ray and brought into Landing Zone Albany by the reinforcements.
Page 317 One of the yardsticks for measuring success in those day's was the amount of captured weapons.
Page 317 Landing Zone Albany 154 weapons captured, 403 PAVN KIA. estimated 150.
Lt. Col. McDade claimed only 303 enemy KIA. 268 weapons. A 24 hour fight.
FACT: Over 268 weapons were captured at Landing Zone Albany,
Lt. Col. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway short Landing Zone Albany over 114 weapons.
Page 199 241 weapons captured at Landing Zone X-Ray 634 PAVN KIA. 1,215 estamated KIA. A 72 hour fight.
Battalion Commanders duty:
Technical and Tactical Proficiency.
The commander knows the technical and tactical aspects of all assets that comprise his battlefield operating systems.
He understands and uses terrain well. He communicates this knowledge and his professionalism through his actions and through interactions with other officers and soldiers.
Delegation. The commander trusts his subordinate leaders and delegates authority to them. He develops them so the mission can continue when he is gone. This is leadership in depth throughout the chain of command.
MISSION TACTICS
The purpose of command and control is to allow the commander to generate and apply combat power at the decisive point on the battlefield.
Mission tactics is a method of directing military operations; subordinates are encouraged and expected to act alone in executing assigned missions, consistent with the intent of senior commanders.
The commander must--
Assign resources with as few restrictions on employment as possible. The commander allocates assets and support priorities to subordinates and specifies only the results he wants achieved.
Allow maximum freedom of action within the scope of his intent. Because battles often develop in unforeseen directions, leaders often must act with incomplete information or instructions.
Failure to act quickly can result in a lack of superior combat power at critical times and places. Taking advantage of opportunities to accomplish the mission is allowed, encouraged, expected, and sometimes required. Higher commanders should be informed before action is taken, if feasible.
Structure communication to allow subordinates to command well forward. The commander must position himself on the battlefield where he can exert the greatest influence, both through subordinate leaders and directly.
At the same time, he must retain the ability to shift the main effort of the battle. The commander can be forward with the lead elements in the command group, or he can be in the main Command Post. He must be able to command and control all organic and supporting elements equally from either location.
Subordinate initiative and independence, though encouraged, is limited by the requirements for unity of command, unity of effort, and the commander's intent.
Subordinates who feel they must disobey orders due to a perceived change in the situation must accept the responsibility for their actions.
The commander's intent must be clearly stated and foremost in the minds of subordinate leaders. To win, subordinate leaders must display initiative, but their initiative must be driven by their understanding of the commanders' intent, not by a desire for independent action. For best results, unit actions are synchronized. If independent action is required to meet the commander's intent for the operation, the action is taken--but subordinate leaders must carefully balance the need for synchronized unit action with the changing tactical situation.
They must look at the big picture. Thus initiative and freedom of action are more likely used during an exploitation or pursuit; an independent action during a delay or during a withdrawal under enemy pressure could produce disaster for the entire force.
FACT: The 3rd Brigade The 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry and 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry were the "leg's" of the 11 Air Assault. in the fact Lt.Col. Moore had his troops were constatanly looking for landing zones, the other Brigades at least the 1st didnt need to look for landing zone as they could Reppel
According to Lt. Col. Moore the 2/7 had no Air Assault trianing at all.
The 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry were Infantry with minimal training in the use Helicopters for transport.
No where in the book does Lt. Col. Moore write about Sling loading, Rappelling, setting up Landing Zones for nite use. and other things the rest of the 11 Air Assault had to learn.
Kinnard was so proud of his men that he prepared a special air assault badge for them, designed to duplicate the spirit of the paratrooper with aviator wings.
The Army refused to officially recognize it.
It would, however, gain official sanction fifteen years later when revived for the airmobile infantrymen of the modern post-Vietnam Army.
To my understanding no one from the 2nd Infantry Division attached, assinged was given the 11 Air Assault Wing's.
The 11 Air Assault wing's, These wing's were unauthorized and not put in anyone's 201 file. nor were they given to any units that were in Vietnam.
The original wings, Wings on a shield with crossed Rifle and Lightning bolt.
The Air Asault Wings werent authorized until 1996 ( new Version )front view of a UH-1 with wings.
Leadership Principle 1
Be Technically and Tactically Proficent
To know you job thoroughly, You must posses not only specific knowledge of its details but also a broad general knowledge concerning its area of intrest.
You should be competent in combat operations and training as well as in the technical and admimistrative aspects of your duties.
If you demonstrate deficincies in these functions,your subordinates will lose confidance in you as a leader.
Keep abreast of current military devolopements.
Page 20 Lt. Col. Moore didnt Know the Toe ( Table of origanization and equipement ) of his Battalion. He only has two M-60 machine guns in the Platoons weapon squads.
When the weapons squads had 2 M60's and 2 M-67 90mm Recoilless Rifles. ( Anti-Tank ) These weapons were Key, Becouse they only weighed 35 pounds.
They gave the unit during the Assault phase the only Anti-Tank weapons.
The M72 LAW was a new weapon in 1965
Lt. Col. Moore couldnt READ a MAP?
Page 30 November 9, 1965 Lt. Col. Moore "What does the RED STAR that is on the intelligence map mean?"
The Red Star is not a standard military symbol, Its explanation should have been on the lower right side margin of the map.
RED means enemy as does double lines.
Page 33 Lt. Col. Moore "I had no doubt the 1/7 my Battalion would be chosen to mount the attack into the Ia Drang."
As the 2/7 had a new commander. The Brigade Commander was breaking them in gently, and only sending them to areas there was no possibility of enemy contact.( strange statement as no one knew where the enemy was.)
Fact: The 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry was closer to the objective, Then the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry.
It had nothing to do with the Readiness, Training of the Battalions.( Gen. John J. Tolson )
Page 17 Lt. Col. Moore's new concepts & techniques were written in the 1950's
Feild Manual 57-35 Army Transport Avation-Combat Operations.
1960's Feild Manual 57-35 Airmobile Operations.
Field Manual 7-20 Infantry, Airborne Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Battalions
Field Manual 1-100 Army Aviation
Field Manual 22-100 Military Leadership
By Officers he worked with?
Page 17 Lt. Col. Moore "In 1957 for 2 1/2 years I was in on the concept of Airmobility with Pentagon Reasearch and developement group.
"I was the 1st man in the Airborne Branch." 2 1/2 years in R&D and 1 1/2 in the 11 Air Assault for a total of 4 years. Writing Tatics? and training in Airmobile tatics.
Lt. Col. Moore retained nothing. Like Col. Klink he knew nothing, nothing.
Keep abreast of current military devolopements
Page 41 Lt. Col. Moore "I thought up a new technique for the inital lift."
There are only two types of Air assaults. Lt. Col. Moore under the delusion he has come up with a new technique, For the assault phase.
But chose the secound type from FM 57-35 Air Mobile Operations.
The ground Commander must concider two general types of Airmobile assault when preparing the ground tatical plan. These types of assaults differ primarily in the proximity of the Landing Zone to the assault objective.
A.The first and preferred type is the landing of the assault ehelons immediately on, or adjacent to, the objective.
B.The secound type of assault involves landing a distance from the objective in a secure Landing zone, and requires assembly, reorganization, and movement to an attack position prior to the assault on the objective.
Page 37 Aviation Commander ( Crandall ) "The Ground Commander ( Lt. Col. Moore ) wanted Aviation to be present, part of his Staff when planning the operation"
FM 57-35 Both the Ground Commander and Aviation Commander or his ALO (Air Liasion Officer) had to plan Reconnaissance, Air Space coordination communications,weather and landing zone considerations. Troops available.
a. The Air Assault Task Force should have enough combat power to seize initial objectives and protect the Landing Zone until follow-on echelons arrive in the objective area.
b. Assault ( lift ) helicopter capability is the single most important variable in determining how much combat power can be introduced into the objective area.
c. Aircrew endurance must be considered. For planning purposes, the Air Assault Task Force Commander should consider eight hours a day and four hours of night flying to be a safe limit for aircrews.
If those limits are exceeded during a single period, then degraded aircrew performance can be expected on the following days.
The foundation of a successful air assault operation is the commander's ground tactical plan, around which subsequent planning is based.
The ground tactical plan specifies actions in the objective area to ultimately accomplish the mission and address subsequent operations.
Elements of the ground tactical plan.
a. The ground tactical plan for an air assault operation contains essentially the same elements as any other infantry attack but differs in that it is prepared to capitalize on speed and mobility in order to achieve surprise.
Assault echelons are placed on or near the objective and organized so as to be capable of immediate seizure of objectives and rapid consolidation for subsequent operations.
If adequate combat power cannot be introduced quickly into the objective area, then the air assault force must land away from the objective and build up combat power.
The air assault force then assaults like any other infantry unit and the effectiveness of the air assault operation is diminished.
b. The scheme of maneuver may assume a variety of possibilities depending on the commander's evaluation including, in particular, the availability of Landing Zones in the area. The plan should include:
(1) Missions of all task force elements and methods for employment.
(2) Zones of attack, sectors, or areas of operations with graphic control measures.
(3) Task organization to include command relationships.
(4) Location and size of reserves.
(5) Fire support to include graphic control measures.
(6) Combat service support.
NOTE: This plan is prepared by the Air Assault Task Force commander, Staff with input from all task force elements and is in sufficient detail to facilitate understanding by subordinate commanders.
It is imperative that all aircrews know this ground tactical plan and the ground commander's intent.
Development of flight routes.
a. Flight routes are developed based on tactical and technical factors. It may be necessary for a route to pass through an adjacent unit's sector. When that is the case, approval from that unit is obtained and coordination is made. Regardless of route direction or location, certain criteria are considered.
b. Seldom are all characteristics present in any one situation; one or more may have to be omitted. Flight routes:
(1) Are as short as possible, consistent with other considerations.
(2) Avoid turns in excess of 45 degrees, when formation flying is required, to facilitate control of the aircraft formation.
(3) Provide terrain masking to deny exposure to enemy observation, direct fire weapons, and radar acquisition, if possible.
(4) Provide cover when terrain permits, placing terrain mass and/or vegetation between the enemy and the aircraft.
(5) Provide for ease of navigation (day or night).
(6) Avoid masking friendly fires, particularly supporting artillery.
(7) Avoid known enemy units and air defense positions.
(8) Avoid overflight of built-up areas.
Flight corridor.
a. When there is competition for airspace, it may be necessary to modify the flight route(s) and designate a flight corridors). The corridor reserves airspace around a flight route for Air Assault Task Force use, and prevents artillery, tactical air (TACAIR), and other elements from firing or flying through when it is in use.
b. Authority to establish a flight corridor is obtained from the brigade and/or division commanders). Designated flight corridors are coordinated through airspace management channels. This ensures that airspace within corridors is not violated.
c. The corridor begins as a flight route and is then modified as required. The size of corridors varies. Normally, they extend 200 to 300 meters on either side of the designated flight route, and 500 feet above and below the route flight altitude.
d. Helicopter formations operating at terrain flight (low) altitudes do not require minimum altitude corridor designations. The upper air limit of the corridor may vary and would be specified by the headquarters establishing it.
e. If it is necessary to restrict the operational area to only those aircraft directly involved in the air assault operation, a restricted area can be established by the airspace management element.
Flight axis.
a. The flight axis is another variation of the flight route. It is a flight route that has width (like the corridor) but does not have airspace reserved to a specific altitude (as does the corridor).
b. The flight axis permits deviation laterally along the flight route but does not restrict the employment of other assets. It gives the Air Mobile Commander a choice in selecting en route formations and freedom to alter direction without coordinating a new flight route.
Expedient flight routes.
These routes are established with checkpoints. If time is not available to develop and disseminate Pick-up Zone, Landing Zone, and flight route information, the commander can define an expedient route by reference to checkpoints.
Flight route control measures.
a. Control measures assist in navigation and provide control to ensure the Air Assault Task Force arrives in the Landing Zone on time and in sequence.
b. Air control points ( ACP ) designate each point where the flight route changes direction They include readily identifiable topographic features or points marked by electronic navigational aids. A route may have as many ACPs as necessary to control the air movement. The SP ( Start Point ) and RP ( Realease Point )are also air control points
c. An ACP may be further designated as a communication checkpoint (CCP). A CCP is a point along the flight route that serial commanders report to the Air Mobile Commander. Radio transmissions are made only when necessary. If a report is required, the transmission is short. This is possible by using codes. For example, the short radio transmission, "One, One King," could mean that the first serial of lift I is crossing CCP King.
Designation of routes.
a. Once tentative flight routes are identified, they are designated for use by each unit. When large groups of aircraft are employed, dispersion is achieved by using multiple routes. However, with large serials it is often necessary to use fewer routes, or even a single route, in order to concentrate available supporting fires. Also, the number of alternate and return routes may be limited.
b. Primary, alternate, and return routes to be used by each subordinate unit are designated. When selecting routes, the following factors are considered:
(1)Interference with ground action. Overflying ground elements may interfere with their supporting fire. Flight routes should be clear of the gun-target line when possible.
(2) Support of landing plan. To reduce vulnerability of the air assault force, flight routes should facilitate rapid approach, landing, and departure from selected LZs.
(3) Enemy ground and air capabilities. Selected flight routes make maximum use of terrain, cover, and concealment to minimize enemy observation and target acquisition.
(4) Available fire support. Flight routes allow support from all available resources.
(5) Available air cover. Flight routes are identified in order to provide air cover for friendly forces en route.
(6) Weather conditions. Flight routes remain usable based on prevailing weather during execution of the air assault operation.
(7) Terrain. Flight routes use terrain to maximum advantage to reduce vulnerability of the aircraft formations.
(8) Time (distance) from Pick-up Zone to Landing Zone. Flight routes are as short as possible to reduce flying time.
This is also when Lt. Col. Moore ( who is in charge of the whole Operation ) should have told Crandall how he wanted the Huey's set up. No extra Ammo, Gear and minimum amount of fuel + a 30 Minute Reserve as the Huey crew carried their comfort gear and other items
As you see The ground commander ( Lt. Col. Moore ) couldnt plan the operation with out Avation ( Crandall ) present.
FM 57-35 : Key personnel are distributed among the aircraft of the lift.
So the loss of one aircraft does not destroy the command structure.
Page 58 The Ground Commander ( Lt. Col. Moore ) and the Aviation commander ( Crandall ) in the same Huey. ( The Planners of the Operation )
Page 59 The lift is flying at 110 knots. When diffrent types of aircraft fly in a single lift, cruising speed of the slower aircraft must be the controlling speed of the lift.
UH-1B's are Gunships and cruising speed at 80 knots becouse of the weight of the weapons and ammo it carries.
UH-1D's are Slicks and cruise at 110 knots
Page 35 What happend to the H-hour? H-hour is difined as the time the lead helicopter touches down on the Landing Zone.
Lt. Col. Moore puts H-1030 as the H-hour. He then gets word the Artillary cant fire untill H-1017
H-hour get set back 1 increment? usually 15 minutes so that would make H-hour H-1045.
Lt. Col. Moore doesnt set foot on Landing Zone X-Ray untill H-1048, 3 minutes late.
I ask Bco's 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader, Dennis Deal why didnt Col. Moore lay on water for his men? B company would be on the Landing Zone for over 4 hours.
Why Lt. Col. Moore said it was not the Aviations job to haul out Wounded Troops?
B company's 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal "dont ask me I knew nothing about Airmobile tatics."
Dennis Deal had taken over the 3rd Platoon 2 week's prior to Landing Zone X-Ray.
Page 106 Lt. Col. Moore "we needed water, medical supplies and ammo"
Page 107 B company 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal by 3pm we ran out of water, the wounded kept begging for water.
Page 145 November 15, 1965 at 6:20am Jemison shared his last drops of water.
Page 112 November 14, 1965 While all day long the Battalion Supply Officer S-4 ( Gorden P. Rozanski )
Was riding in and out of Landing Zone X-Ray and Joseph L. Galloway came. 240# of water, medical, ammo not coming in on each lift.
The sad part 1 Wounded troop was not going out.
Page 106 Lt. Col. Moore "hauling Wounded was not the slick crews job" ( Aviation )
FM 7-20 Hauling wounded is the secoundary mission of all military aircraft.
FM 7-20 Page 271 paragraph 313 returning supporting/ organic aircraft may be used for the evacuation of casualities.
Page 63 Lt. Col. Moore used his command Huey to haul out a non wounded POW. which was one of Crandall's jobs.
Page 167 But none of his wounded troops, Lt Franklin terribly wounded, Was set aside to die.
FM 1-100 Army Aviation The Command and Control Huey is to be used for Command and Control ONLY it is not to be used for anyother purpose.
A Medevac Huey was suppose to fly with the assault echelon. Layed on by Lt. Col. Moore
Page 105 A wounded troop was stumbling, lurching toward the aid station.
Joseph L. Galloway " Stay away go back" what was this 17 year old's thoughts 50 feet from the aid station and treatment and told to stay away. minutes earler Galloway had rescued a burned troop and now that the bullets are flying he dosent want anyone to draw fire to him
FM 57-35 probable water supply points are predesingnated. and comes in with the fowllowing echelons.
FM 7-20 Returning aircraft may be used for the evacuation of casualities. ( Its called Back Haul )
Joseph L. Galloway a Senior writer for the U.S. News and World Report
His stories part fiction for them. Oct 29,1990 Page 32 Fatal Victory Page 36 Vietnam Story.
Articles Joseph L. Galloway Plagirized.
October 25,1993 60th Anneverisery Issue
Page 45 Step by Step into a Quagmire.
Source: Stanley Karnows Vietnam a History Pages 479-485.
Feb 4,1991 Pg 49 Who's Afraid of the truth.
Source: Soldier of Fortune Dec 84 Page 104 press escorts by Fred Tucker. ( Tucker Gorillas )
Joseph L. Galloway HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, Or training.
From the U.S. News and World Report Dec.6,1993
Page 32-33 Joseph L. Galloway "28 years later, The fighting holes at landing Zone X-Ray had eroded, Faded away.
But at Landing Zone Albany the fighting positions were perfect, corners still square, dirt still on parapets and clear of vegetation
This last statement should be in the X Files
Page 156-157 Joseph L. Galloway and Vincent Cantu meet during the "fierce attack on D and C Coompany's"
Galloway was taking pictures, Cantu braved the fire and sprinted to where the Galloway was.
Original story Soldier of Fortune Sept 83
Page 28 Joseph L. Galloway during a "LULL" in the battle, I met Cantu at Landing Zone X-Ray this was before the skyhawk naplmed the Command Post
To this date Lt. Col. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway have know idea what type of Aircraft dropped the naplam.
They now say it was an F-100 Super Saber. others say it was an 105.
Page 35 Joseph L. Galloway The plantation billed the U.S. $50 for each tea bush and $250 for each rubber tree.
Original story Soldier of Fortune Sept 83 Page 25 Joseph L. Galloway They billed U.S.$25 for each tea bush $125 for each rubber tree.
when did Galloway meet the Command Sgt. Major?
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY:
No one expects the battalion commander to act as a rifleman no matter how proficient he is.
As he does so,
Who commands his battalion?
Who gives guidance to his Company Commanders,
He is taking responsibility away from his men and not meeting his own.
Page 34 Lt. Col. Moore "I went to school on the Division Commander( Kinnard )authority must be pushed down to the man on the spot."
Leadership Principle 9
Develop a sense of Responsibility in your subordianates
Delegation of authority commensurate with responsibility developes mutual confidenece and respect between senior and subordinates.
It also encourages the subordinate to exercise initiative and to give wholeharted cooperation.
The leader who, by properly delegating authority, demomstrates faith in his subordinates will increse their desire to accept greater responsibility.
FAILURE TO DELEGATE NECESSARY AUTHORITY IS POOR LEADERSHIP some examples Page 31 November the 9th, LT. Col. Moore "We Shuttled the Battalion in on 16 Hueys, Plumbly and I Landed with the first elements of Capt. Tony Nadal's A company.
Page 40 November the 14 Lt. Col. Moore "I personally to influence the action would be in the 1st Huey to land, On Landing Zone X-Ray."
Page 60 Lt. Col. Moore leading his command group clear a sector of Landing Zone X-Ray, On the way back to the Landing Zone, Meets the troops who were suppose to clear that sector.
Page 73 When the Battle started Lt. Col. Moore "I was tempted to join A or C company's men"
Who would be in charge? What would the Company commanders do?
Page 108 Lt. Col. Moore "Matt and Mickey had controlled all flights into X-Ray.
I then took Control,
Every Huey coming to Landing Zone X-Ray must radio "Me" for landing instructions."
Page 109 Crandall "Lt. Col. Moore was now a signalman at the far end of the Landing Zone was standing up, directing us where to land."
Page 109 The 3rd Brigade Commander( Col. Brown )had given Lt. Col. Moore pathfinders
Page 195 Lt. Col. Moore I personally lead the final counterattack to make certian that the Company Commander ( Diduryk ) of Bco 2/7 & his men did a safe, clean, job and to look for my Missing Troops.
Page 58 Lt. Col. Moore didnt bring in his Execuitive Officer Wirth ( 2nd in command ) to help run the battalion command post.
Lt. Col. Moore "The Battalion Rear Command Post was run by my Executive Officer Major Wirth".
FM 7-20 The excuitive Officer place is normally in the Main Battalion Command Post( during Combat )
EXECUTIVE OFFICER ( XO )
The XO is second in command and the battalion commander's main assistant. As the second in charge, he must be prepared to assume the duties of the commander.
a. The XO, as the coordinator of the battalion staff, establishes staff operating procedures.
He ensures the commander and staff are informed on matters affecting the command. To coordinate and synchronize the plan, the XO assembles and supervises the staff during the decision-making process.
He establishes the required liaison. Unless instructed otherwise by the commander, all staff officers inform the XO of any recommendations or information they give directly to the commander or any instructions they receive directly from the commander.
When required, he represents the commander, SUPERVISES THE MAIN COMMAND POST and its Operations, and provides for battalion logistical support.
b. The XO, as the second in command, transmits the commander's decision to staff sections and, in the name of the commander, to subordinate units as needed.
The XO keeps abreast of the situation and future plans and represents the commander during the commander's absence.
He is considered a combat leader and is prepared to assume command at any time. During combat, he supports the commander by anticipating problems and synchronizing operations at the MAIN COMMAND POST.
ALTHOUGHT THE XO NORMALLY STAYS IN THE MAIN COMMAND POST( DURING COMBAT,) HE MUST BE READY TO MOVE IF HE IS REQUIRED AT ANOTHER LOCATION.
c. All information flows through the TOC and the XO except when circumstances require otherwise. The exception occurs during fast-paced operations when vital information flows via orders and reports between the command group and the key maneuver elements. In this situation, the XO is a key leader in the TOC, sometimes checking attachments--for example, monitoring the nets and progress of supporting units--monitoring the overall battle, ensuring reports are rendered as necessary, supervising planning of future operations, and providing the commander with situational assessments as needed.
d. The XO assumes responsibility for the diverse elements operating in the TOC during the battle.
Those elements receive and analyze information from a wide variety of sources. The XO analyzes all of this for information that might be immediately useful to the commander.
The commander uses the XO's analysis along with the steady flow of information coming from his subordinate commanders and the advice of the operations officer.
KEY DUTIES
SUPERVISES THE MAIN COMMAND POST AND ITS OPERATIONS, DURING COMBAT AND PROVIDES FOR BATTALION LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.
He supports the Commander by anticipating problems and synchronizing operations at the main Command Post.
Although the XO NORMALLY STAYs in the MAIN COMMAND POST DURING COMBAT, he must be ready to move if he is required at another location.
NOTE: Lt. Col. Moore allowed no one on Landing Zone X-Ray that out Ranked Him, untill the Generals came.
INTEGRITY
Integerity, the uprightness of character and soundness of moral principles, the quality of absolute truthfulness and honesty, is an indespensable trait of a leader.
On the Armed Forces team the stakes are to hight to place the lives of its members in the hands of men with questionable Integerty.
Unless a man be honest, he cannot be relied upon at all. there is no compromise.
The military proffession does not permit the slightest deviation from the higest standards of personal integerty.
Be accurate and truthful in ALL STATEMENTS, both official and unoffical.
some examples of Lt. Col. Moores poor Integerty Page 39 the statement: Lt. Col. Moore "We had never maneuvered in combat as a battalion."
the Facts: Page 28 Lt. Col. Moore in October the Battalion made 2 sweeps near An Khe base camp.
Page 31 Nov 9,1965 LT. Col. Moore "We shuttled the Battalion in 16 Hueys"
Page 32 Nov 9,1965 Joseph L. Galloway "My first time out with Lt. Col. Moore's 1/7 Battalion"
Original story Soldier of Fortune November 83 Page 25 Nov 9 Joseph L. Galloway "Before nitefall Lt. Col. Moore waved his 1/7 battalion across a narrow, cold chest deep stream"
Hueys could carry 10 Troops
10 troops X 16 Hueys=160 Troops
Nadal of A company now said the Lt. Col. Moore was conducting a Reconnaissance in force
Page 30 A Enemy base camp.
Page 55 A radio transmision intercepted, estamated a N V regiment was near Landing Zone X-Ray.
Page 57 Commo wire was seen.
Pg 39 Lt. Col. Moore puts only 80 men ( 5 per Huey ) in the Assault echelon.
Page 57 Riflemen extra ammo all they could carry.
Commanders must remove the mind-set that they must carry everything to be ready for anything that might happen.
In some cases, soldiers have to carry more than the recommended combat weight.
Leaders must know how excess weight negatively affects the mission and must set the example by traveling light.
Air Assault tatics emphasize maximum initial lift, to get maximum lift each huey carries minimum amount of fuel + 30 min reserve, with refueling and ammo Points near the Pickup Zone to save time when refuling.
Troops carry only the basic load of ammo 300 rounds, Rifle and web gear Pistol belt, harness, 3 ammo pouches, intrenching tool, 2 canteens, bayonet and poncho and 1st aid pack.
This would include the items in the attack order. 1 meal,2 hand grenades, LAW M-72
Page 40 Lt. Col. Moore "later lifts could carry more men, 100 as fuel burned off".
Page 198 Rear area Operation Officer ( Dick Merchant ) "the Huey could carry 10 men"
Page 111 Paul Winkel "I had a total of 16 men in my Huey". Had we burned of enought fuel to lift off?
Formier "It was left up to each pilot how many men he carried" on later lifts I was carrying 9-12 troops.
How it should have happend according to Air Assault Tatics
THE LANDING PLAN
a. The landing plan must support the ground tactical plan. This plan sequences elements into the area of operations, ensuring that units arrive at designated locations and times prepared to execute the ground tactical plan.
b. General considerations in developing the landing plan are:
(1) The availability, location, and size of potential Landing Zones are overriding factors.
(2) The Air Assault Task Force is most vulnerable during landing.
(3) Elements must land with tactical integrity.
(4) Troops are easily disoriented if the briefed landing direction changes, and they are not kept informed.
(5) Initially, there may be no other friendly units in the area. The Air Assault Task Force must land prepared to fight in any direction.
(6) The landing plan should offer flexibility so that a variety of options are available in developing a scheme of maneuver.
(7) Supporting fires ( artillery, naval gunfire, Combat Air Support, attack helicopters ) must be planned in and around each Landing Zone.
(8) Although the objective may be beyond the range of supporting artillery fire, artillery or mortars may be brought into the landing zone(s) early to provide fire support for subsequent lifts and on the objective.
(9) The plan should include provisions for resupply and medical evacuation by air.
Feild Manual 57-35 Airmobile Operations
With only 16 Hueys weight is a factor,
The Assault echelon shouldnt be shuttled. If it has to be shuttled, The assault echelon must have the necessary combat power to secure the Landing Zone.
Th Huey's maximun load is 4,000 pounds, The Alowable Cargo Load the( ACL )of each UH-1D for this mission should have been 3,000 pounds as its under 50 nautical miles( only 14.3 miles to the objective )
Using the Space method.
A space is defined as the weight of a fully loaded combat equiped troop ( 240 pounds )
10 Troops = 2,400 pounds per Huey
Lt. Col. Moore's way 503 troops to get to Landing Zone X-Ray 80 troops per lift
16 Hueys over 4 hours to put the 1at Battalion 7th Cavalry on LZ X-Ray.
Lt. Col. Moore failed to use his attached units assets for the assault on Landing Zone X-Ray.
The Artillary unit had 5 CH-47's ( Chinooks ) each one could carry 32-44 troops.
The 1/9 also had a Blue team a rifle platoon and 4 hueys.
Even after having the 1/9 fly the recon, he made Landing Zone X-Ray a 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry assault only.
Page 56 Lt.Col. Moore had used the Artillary CH-47's in the morning to bring B company 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry from Catecka ( Brigade Headquarters )to Plei Me camp.
32 Troops X 5 CH-47's = 160 troops or 44 Troops X 5 CH-47's = 220 troops
The CH-47's were used as the original troop carriers for the 11 Air Assault in 1963 why didnt Moore use them?
16 Hueys = 160 troops 5 CH 47's= 160 troops 1/9 Blues 40 troops TOTAL 360 troops in initial lift.
He then could have used the 4 Huey's from the Blues to help bring the rest of his Battalion to Landing Zone X-Ray, For a total of 20 Huey's and 5 Chinook's
Time to put the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry on
Landing Zone X-Ray 1 hour.
Extra ammo and personnal gear and water comes in the rear echelon
Lt. Col. Moore was a Pilot?
Page 58 The Avation Commander ( Crandall ) is starting the Huey from the left seat the co-pilots seat.
There is no starter on that side.
Page 58 Lt. Col. Moore who is a Pilot as they load the Hueys "what is the precise flying time from Plei Me to X-Ray"? 14.3miles.
Page 37 The Ground Commander ( Lt. Col. Moore ) and the Aviation Commander ( Crandall ) plan an operation.
Page 40 With a time table and failed to put down the flying time from Plei Me to Landing Zone X-Ray? How did the plan or even compliet the rest of the operation with out this critical piece of information as the entire operation revolved around the time from Plei Me to Landing Zone X-Ray.
AIR MOVEMENT PLAN
a. The air movement plan is based on the ground tactical and landing plans.
It specifies the schedule and provides instructions for air movement of troops, equipment, and supplies from Pick-up Zones to Landing Zones.
It also provides coordinating instructions regarding air routes, air control points, and aircraft speeds, altitudes, and formations.
The planned use of attack helicopters, to include security and linkup locations ( if different from Pick-up Zone ), Should also be included in the air movement plan. ( When operations involve multiple lifts from the same Pick-up Zone, a lift table is prepared to ensure lifts are properly organized. )
b. The air movement plan is normally developed in coordination with the Air Mission Commander(AMC), or the aviation liaison officer ( ALO ), who provides technical assistance and recommendations
Air movement table.
a. The air movement table:
(1) Contains aircraft allocations.
(2) Designates number and type of aircraft in each serial.
(3) Specifies departure point, route to and from loading area, and loading, lift-off, and landing times.
b. The table is prepared jointly by the Air Assault Task Force Commander, Staff and aviation personnel and it is completed in detail since it serves as the primary movement document.
NOTE: The table controls Air Assault Task Force movement from Pick-up Zone to Landing Zone as air assault forces fly to the Landing Zone utilizing radio listening silence, if possible.
c. The table ensures that all personnel, equipment, and supplies are accounted for in the movement, that each aircraft is ( fully loaded ), correctly positioned in the flight, and directed to the right Landing Zone.
The table must also include the refuel schedule for all lifts, if required.
Page 58 Jon Mills 13 min 15 sec.
Page 59 rate( speed in knots )110 knots this time will take them 25 miles away.
The correct time is 8 minutes
Formula for Time is. Distance X 60 divided by Rate(speed in knots) 14.3 X 60 = 858 divide by 110 = 7.8 minutes
Time is rounded up to the nearest minute=8 minutes
Formula for Distance is Rate ( speed in knots ) X Time divided by 60 110 X 8 = 880 divide by 60 = 14.6 miles
Miles is rounded up to the nearest 1/2 mile=15 miles
Using 7.8 min from the distant above 110 X 7.8 = 858 divide by 60 = 14.3 miles the distance from Plei Me to Landing Zone X-Ray.
page 58 What happend to Lt. Col. Moores H-hour, Moore sets the h-hour as 10:30am < why a civilian time shoulnt it be 1030hrs? Military time.
Moore was told that the Artillary coulnt fire till 10:17am, so H-hour slid back?? accordingly.
so that would make H-hour 10:45am, usually a 15 minute increment.
But Lt. Col. Moore who is in the lead Huey Crandall's dosent set foot on Landing Zone X-Ray untill 10:48am 3 minutes late.
Page 188 A blazing flare under an unopened parachute hit the ammo dump, The Sgt.Major grabbed it with his bare hands.
The flare burns at 4,000 degrees F, Lava's tempture is around 2,000 degrees, Glass is molten around 2,000 degrees and 4,000 degrees is the tempture the space shuttle encounters when it reenters the earths atmosphere, and He grabbed it with his bare hands??
If the parachute does not function the flare will not ignite.
You dont salute on the Battlefield
Page 125 The reinforcement Company commander ( Diduryk ) salutes the ground Commander ( Lt. Col. Moore )as they come into Landing Zone X-Ray
Page 173 The ground Commander ( Lt. Col. Moore ) salutes the Brigade Commander ( COL. Brown ) as he come to view the battlefield.
Lt. Col. Moore's EXPLANITION FOR HIS WEAPONS LOSSES:
Page 198 Lt. Col. Moore " We lost a lot of our own weapons which were taken from our our wounded men at the hospitals".
Lt. Col. Moore's Battalion lost about 200 weapons when C Company was over ran.
ACCOUNTABILITY, The accountability of personnel and their equipment IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PARENT UNIT. ( Lt. Col. Moore's 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry )
FM 7-20 Prior to evacuation of casualties, equipement is collected from individual evacuees. Care is taken to insure that collection of equipement weapons, watches, binocoulars does not prevent later identifaction of the individual.
Why would Lt. Col. Moore make such a statement when is clear he was taking the weapons from his wounded and dead.
from The U.S.News and World Report October 29, 1990 ( picture by Joseph L. Galloway ) Page 32-33 clearly show's the weapons and equipement taken from his casualities.
The same picture is the cover page for Vietnam magazine December 1998 front cover.
Same picture also shows his mortars setting on the ground not dug in as Lt. Col. Moore and Cantu said they were.
No wonder some were knocked out during one of the attacks.
Page 155 Parish was one of the mortarmen who had been outfitted with one of the spare machine guns and rifles collected from our casualties.
SPARE MACHINE GUN'S? In the dead pile! The M-60 machine gun the Infantry's main source of continuous, high volume and accurate fire power.
Why did Lt. Col. Moore allow the M-60 machine gun to be taken from the perimeter when the gunner was wounded or killed and placed in the dead pile?
Restricting his Battalions firepower, and allowing his defenses to be over ran. (C company.)
The final protective line fires delivered by this weapon form an important part of the defdensive fires.
The dead pile was by his command post, and he had been to the dead pile,
So had the Sergent Major. Who's job should have been to help with CSS and the evacuation of the wounded.
MORE MYTHS OF LANDING ZONE X_RAY Thursday, Jun. 4, 1998 Refugio native awarded Bronze Star Former UPI reporter tried to save a wounded soldier during the Vietnam War By STEPHANIE L. JORDAN Staff Writer
BAYSIDE -- For Refugio native Joe Galloway, reporting the Vietnam War meant getting away from press briefings, safe base camps and clean sheets. He saw the war as the grunts saw it, down in the dirt with the heat, death, blood, fear and valor.
And on Nov. 15, 1965, during the first large-scale battle between American troops and the North Vietnamese Army, Galloway stopped being a United Press International reporter and became a hero.
On May 1, 1998, Galloway -- now a senior writer for U.S. News and World Report -- was awarded a Bronze Star with a ``V'' device for valor for his actions during the battle. Galloway, who divides his time between homes in Bayside and Boston, is the first civilian to be given the award from the Army, said Maj. Gen. Joseph K. Kellogg, who presented him with the medal at Fort Bragg, N.C. ` `At that time and that place he was a soldier,'' Kellogg said. ``He was a soldier in spirit, he was a soldier in actions and he was a soldier in deeds.''
Galloway was honored for trying to save a wounded soldier during one of the pivotal battles of the Vietnam War, a battle that left 234 Americans dead.
``I know that wasn't my job, but in those days everyone did what they could to survive and help everyone else make it out of there alive,'' Galloway said.
While with troops of the 7th Cavalry's 1st Battalion -- part of the First Cavalry Division -- fighting in the Central Highlands, Galloway was in the battalion command post when an American fighter mistakenly dropped napalm near the position.
Galloway, crouching down to avoid enemy fire, saw PFC Jimmy Nakayama and Spc.5 James Clark get caught by the flames. With the help of Sgt. George Nye, Galloway grabbed Nakayama's feet and carried him to safety.
Clark died and, two days later, so did Nakayama.
``When I grabbed his feet, his boots just fell off, and I remember my hands touching raw bones,''
Galloway said. ``We carried him away and he was screaming. I can still hear those screams.''
Harold G. Moore, then the 1st Battalion commander, didn't learn about Galloway's actions until the two collaborated on ``We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young,'' a best-selling book about the history of the battle published in 1992. Moore, who retired as a three-star general, put Galloway in for the award.
``There was grazing machine-gun fire going over our heads and he got up in that grazing fire and ran to that soldier to save him,'' Moore said. ``One of my medics got shot, but Joe kept going. When the battle was over . . . I never gave any thought to giving this award to a civilian.''
For the 17-year-old 1958 Refugio High graduate, just getting to the Ia Drang Valley was a battle.
Galloway, now 56, said he wasn't a great student in high school and was only interested in reading, writing and history. He attended Victoria Junior College for six weeks, but didn't like it because it was too much like high school.
``I was on my way to join the Army when my mom, God bless her, said `But what about your journalism?' '' Galloway said. ``We just so happened to be driving by the Victoria Advocate's office so I stopped in and asked if I could be a reporter.''
After 18 months at the Advocate, Galloway joined UPI. At age 19, he was named bureau chief of UPI's Topeka, Kan., bureau, the youngest bureau chief in the history of the wire service. ``I guess that's because I was a young man in a hurry,'' Galloway said.
During his three years in Topeka, from 1961 to 1964, Galloway began lobbying his bosses to send him to Tokyo, the UPI bureau that covered the growing war in Vietnam. ``I knew this was my generation's war,'' he said. ``Not to have gone would have been much harder to explain than going is.''
He was in Tokyo for six months before going to Vietnam to cover the Marines.
From his first days in-country, Galloway worked hard to get to a firsthand view of the war. Military leaders weren't always pleased to see him.
But his willingness to show up in the field, to live with the troops, won the respect of many soldiers.
One of his early converts was H. Norman Schwarzkopf, then a major, who went on to become a four-star general and command the multinational coalition force that won the Persian Gulf War in 1991. In Vietnam, Galloway hooked up with Schwarzkopf in August 1965 at the Du Co Special Forces camp. Schwarzkopf and his South Vietnamese troops had been under attack for two weeks, and Schwarzkopf had just found out the unit would have to walk out of the area.
Galloway showed up and asked to march out with the troops, Schwarzkopf said in a phone interview. ` `I was hot, tired and dirty and had just found out that we had to walk out and the last person I wanted to have around was a fancy-pants reporter,'' Schwarzkopf said. ``But what's different about him is that he really knew how to be at the right place at the right time without being intrusive. He was a friend right away.''
Galloway, Schwarzkopf said, ``is absolutely the finest combat correspondent I've ever known.'' ``He truly understands what ground combat is all about,'' he said. ``He wasn't like many of the other war correspondents who wrote their stories from the rear area, or in the bars in Da Nang and Saigon. He lived the life of the grunts.''
At least once, a commander put Galloway behind a weapon.
In October 1965, after hearing that the U.S. Special Forces camp at Plei Me was surrounded and under siege, Galloway finagled his way aboard a helicopter heading that way.
When Galloway arrived at the tiny Plei Me camp, its commander, Maj. Charles Beckwith -- who later founded the Army's Delta Force -- was less than pleased that a reporter had managed to fly in when his troops were in desperate need of food, ammunition and medical supplies.
``He was jumping up and down on his hat when I got there,'' Galloway said. ``He told me he needed everything in the world but a God damn reporter.''
What he did need was someone to man a machine gun, and appointed Galloway to the task. Beckwith's instructions were simple, Galloway said.
``Don't shoot the little brown men inside the wire because they're mine, but shoot all the little brown men outside the wire,'' said Galloway, repeating Beckwith's words.
For four days and nights Galloway stayed on the line with Beckwith's troops. As Galloway was leaving after the battle, Beckwith gave the reporter an M-16 Galloway carried until the war ended in 1975.
``I told (Beckwith) that I wasn't a combatant and he said, `Son, in these mountains there's no such thing,' '' Galloway said.
A few weeks later, and 14 miles away, Galloway would face many of the same North Vietnamese troops who had attacked Plei Me.
On Nov. 14, hours after the fighting in the Ia Drang Valley had begun, Galloway hopped on a helicopter bound for the fighting. He was kicked off because there wasn't enough room. He boarded another helicopter, but Moore ordered it away because it was too dangerous to land.
Galloway was grounded at the rear command post, itching to get to the action, he said.
He hid out overnight at the base camp while other reporters retreated to beds and warm meals. Galloway asked Capt. Gregory Dillon if he could fly with him to the battle.
``He was such a young guy, but was dedicated to covering the war from the bottom end up,'' said Dillon, who retired as a colonel. ``It was pretty hairy there the first couple of days. We used to have an awful lot of reporters come in after the fact, but he was willing to take the same risks as the soldiers.''
They arrived on the morning of the second day of the battle. Galloway had just spoken with Nakayama when an Air Force F-100 Super Sabre dropped the jellied gasoline on the soldiers.
Two days later, Galloway flew out to Pleiku to file his story. For the work he did in Ia Drang, UPI gave him a raise, from $135 per week to $150.
``I had an exclusive in the biggest battle of the war,'' Galloway said. ``All I had to do was survive.''
On his first tour of Vietnam for UPI, Galloway spent 16 months in-country. He would return three times, the last in 1975 as the North Vietnamese headed to their victory.
``A mentor of mine, Dickey Chapelle, who had covered World War II, once told me you can have the best story in the world, but you have to get out and live to file it,'' Galloway said.``War is a great story. There is always room for you on the front page and in many ways it's a simple story. Afterwards, you wonder if you can cover normal life. I mean you wake up one day, when you're 30, and realize you have more friends dead than alive.''
Galloway lived in Asia for a total of 12 years before transferring to UPI's Moscow bureau. Later, he moved to UPI's Los Angeles bureau as its chief. In 1982, Galloway went to work for U.S. News & World Report, eventually going to work for the magazine in Washington, D.C.
But in 1992, Galloway would go into battle again, this time with tanks and armor roaring across the Iraqi desert. As he did in Vietnam, Galloway reported the war from the sharp end.
Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991, Galloway looked up his old friend H. Norman Schwarzkopf, now commanding the coalition forces. Galloway wanted to return to the First Cav, Schwarzkopf said, but the general knew where the real action would be.
``We argued about it because I wanted him to go on the 24th Mech (Infantry Division),'' Schwarzkopf said. ``I'm sure all the way there he was cursing me under his breath thinking that I wanted to give some press coverage to the 24th.''
But Galloway soon found out that the 24th was one of the armor units assigned to the charge across the desert in an end-run around heavily fortified Kuwait.
Since Galloway had been briefed on the plan, he was able to interview combat leaders before the battle, he said. The ground war started on a Monday, ended on Thursday, and Galloway's story was due on Friday.
Galloway had survived another war.
Joe Galloway still covers the military, but the men he met in Vietnam -- some of whom never returned home -- are never far from his mind.
Galloway often gives talks on military bases, and reminds the men and women in uniform of the unspoken bond that unites a fighting force.
``I remind the soldiers that when they leave (the military) it will be the last day that the man on their left and the man on their right will die for them,'' Galloway said. ``Back when I started uncommon valor was a common virtue. It was during that time when I made some of the best and closest friends of my life.''
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Galloway, Jack P. Smith, Moore's after action report Joseph L. Galloway Jack P. Smith ABC NEWS Moore's after action, written transcript of Oral Operation Order LZ X-RAY