Re: The Movie "We Were Soldiers"

Re: The Movie "We Were Soldiers"

From: Russell L. Ross
Date: 10/10/2004
Time: 1:56:33 AM
Remote Name: 64.12.116.18

Comments

Joe Galloway, Bruce"Snake"P. Crandall, XAV8ER, "We Were Soldiers is FICTION"

Moore's after action report Nov 14, 1965 LZ X-Ray Subj: Crandall was required to pick up wounded

troops.

MOORE "IT WASENT CRANDALL'S JOB TO HAUL OUT

WOUNDED"

CRANDALL "IT WASENT MY JOB TO HAUL OUT WOUNDED!"

BUT Crandall did Haul out a NON WOUNDED PAVN

ENEMY TROOP THOUGH.

CRANDALL NOW HAS TO DO SOMTHING HE DOSENT WANT TO

DO HAUL OUT WOUNDED AMERICAN TROOPS.

CRANDALL "And so that left me having to carry

ammo and medical supplies in and to take

out wounded."

Moore, CRANDALL "It wasn't his ( MY ) job" To haul out the WOUNDED

Was CRANDALL was in a union? NOT HIS JOB to haul WOUNDED! American troops.

FALSE!

Crandall was suppose to pick up the WOUNDED

Its Called BACKHAUL.

Field Manual 57-35 Air Mobile Operations 1963.

1965 Field Manual 7-20 Battalions Infantry,

BATTALION COMMANDERS HANDBOOK

1963 Field Manual 57-35 Air Mobile Operations

mdcrandall Joined: 13 Aug 2002 Posts: 161

Posted: Tue Jan 14, 2003 2:42 pm Post subject: http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/movies/61318_crandall08.shtml

I'll let Dad tell his own story. With only the addition that he was catching a nap on a cot in the ops tent because he thought he was going to have to go back in that night and he wasn't fully awake when the guy grabbed him so considering the fact he had been being shot at all day I'm not surprised he pulled out his gun first and thought to ask questions later --- and once he figured out what was going on he was probably just plain pissed off.

Quote: Real-life hero: 'All day long it was blood' Friday, March 8, 2002

By KRISTIN DIZON SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REPORTER

One of the most dramatic moments in the new Vietnam war film "We Were Soldiers" -- the No. 1 movie in the country last weekend -- depicts jovial helicopter pilot Maj. Bruce Crandall pulling a gun on another officer who questioned his judgment.

It wasn't Hollywood fiction: Crandall, a Washington native and resident, did indeed point a gun at a fellow soldier, but in this case, reality was racier than the screen take.

The man yanked Crandall off a cot and made off-color remarks about his mother. "And so I did go after a weapon," said Crandall, now 69. "But I didn't point it at his head; I pointed it at his crotch.

"If he didn't have the balls to fight the enemy, I mentioned that he sure as hell shouldn't have the balls to come looking me up."

The movie, starring Mel Gibson, is based on the book, "We Were Soldiers Once ... and Young," by retired Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore and journalist Joseph L. Galloway. It's the detailed chronicle of a bloody battle in the Ia Drang valley near the Cambodian border in November 1965.

Last week, Crandall and his wife, Arlene, watched the film with President and Mrs. Bush at the White House. The president told Crandall that it was a story that had to be told.

Crandall's dramatic confrontation came after he tried to

lead two medevac helicopters into a "hot" zone, where

U.S. forces were taking heavy fire and wounded lay in

the dust.

The choppers landed briefly, then flew away -- it was too

hot for them.

"And so that left me having to carry ammo and medical

supplies in and to take out wounded."

It wasn't his job. ,,FALSE

Crandall was suppose to pick up the WOUNDED

Field Manual 57-35 Air Mobile Operations 1963.

Its Called BACKHAUL.

As head of the "A" Company, 229th air assault division

of the Army's First Cavalry Division, Crandall was

supposed to ferry troops on the 16 helicopters he

commanded.

"Every one of the guys I supported knew that if they got hit, I'd come," he said. "And if I went down, they would protect me."

He flew 22 missions in the lead chopper that day -- the first major battle of the war between U.S. and North Vietnamese forces.

Moore, the ground commander played by Gibson, wrote Crandall a note of thanks. "Bruce, had you not stepped forward, organized and led this extraordinarily heroic effort -- we on that field would have gone down," Moore wrote.

Crandall, a native of Olympia and a former all-America high school baseball star, now lives in Manchester on the Kitsap Peninsula. In his senior year at Olympia High School, the left-fielder hit .600 and dreamed of major league baseball. "I wanted to be drafted, but not by the Army. I wanted to be drafted by the Yankees or Baltimore."

The Army punched his Selective Service card in 1953, the last year of the Korean War. Engineering and flight school followed, then Crandall flew mapping missions over remote areas of the Arctic, North Africa, South America and elsewhere. While in the Army, Crandall took 17 years to graduate from college, attending night classes at seven universities.

Crandall was an adviser to "We Were Soldiers." "It portrays accurately what war is like and what it was like that day," said Crandall, who thinks the Vietnam War was winnable had political restraints been lifted. Some things in the film were consolidated, left out or embellished, but other details are quite authentic, he said.

Crandall, portrayed by Greg Kinnear, really did puff on a cigar as he flew off to the battle.

After flying for more than 16 hours the first day of the fight, Crandall stepped out of his blood-drenched chopper and vomited.

"All day long it was blood. My crew chief got shot in the throat. And my aircraft got washed out with buckets -- that happened," Crandall recalled in the West Seattle home of the youngest of his three sons. And that's what Crandall wants people to take from the film: "What we want people to see is how bad war is."

Rescue missions in 1966 earned him a Helicopter Heroism Award. He's also a recipient of the Purple Heart, the Bronze Star and four Distinguished Flying Crosses, among other medals and awards. In 1996, he was inducted into the Air Force's rarefied "Gathering of Eagles," in company with such legends as Alan Shepard and Chuck Yeager.

Crandall went back to Vietnam in 1967 to 1968, after a year's break from combat. He was there just 16 days when he flew a low-level mission in search of a downed chopper and his own Huey was mistakenly taken down by the Air Force.

He crawled away from an enemy sniper and was rescued by an American crew, but his back was broken and he spent five months recovering in a VA hospital. He spent 24 years in the Army, retiring in 1977, then moved on to a master's in public administration, a stint as a city manager in California and a public works manager in Arizona.

One of Crandall's highlights on the movie set at Fort Benning, Ga., was climbing into the pilot's seat of a beloved Huey -- one owned by a private company. He hadn't flown for years because of two strokes.

Everyone clapped on set when Crandall took to the air: "I came back and buzzed the movie set and flipped it around and landed next to them. And I had the biggest smile on my face you've ever seen," Crandall said.

Gibson and Kinnear asked how it felt. "I said, 'Just like I'd never been away. Everything came back. And they said, 'Just like riding a bicycle.' And I said, 'Oh no, no it's much better than that. More like sex, unless you're really into riding a bicycle.'"

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

P-I reporter Kristin Dizon can be reached at 206-448-8118 or kristindizon@seattlepi.com.

Page 198

HARDBACK WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE AND YOUNG

Rear area Operation Officer ( Dick

Merchant ) "the Huey could carry 10 men"

Page 111

Paul Winkel "I had a total of 16 men in my Huey".

Had we burned of enought fuel to lift off?

Formier "It was left up to each pilot how many

men he carried" on later lifts I was carrying

9-12 troops.

UH-1 Huey Helicopter

The most widely used military helicopter, the

Bell UH-1 series Iroquois, better known

as the "Huey", began arriving in Vietnam in 1963.

Before the end of the conflict, more than 5,000

of these versatile aircraft were

introduced into Southeast Asia.

"Hueys" were used for MedEvac, command and

control, and air assault; to transport

personnel and materiel; and as gun ships.

Bell (model 205) UH-1D (1963) had a longer

fuselage than previous models, increased

rotor diameter, increased range, and a more

powerful Lycoming T53-L-11 1100 shp

engine, with growth potential to the Lycoming T53-

L-13 1400 shp engine.

A distinguishing characteristic is the larger

cargo doors, with twin cabin windows, on

each side.

>>The UH-1D, redesigned to carry up to 12 troops,

with a crew of two, reached Vietnam

in 1963.<<

The UH-1D has a range of 293 miles (467km) and a

speed of 127 mph (110 knots).

UH-1D "Hueys" could be armed with M60D door guns,

quad M60Cs on the M6 aircraft armament subsystem,

20mm cannon, 2.75 inch rocket launchers, 40mm

grenade launcher in M5 helicopter chin-turret,

and up to six NATO Standard AGM-22B

( formerly SS-11B ) wire-guided anti-tank

missiles on the M11 or M22 guided missile

launcher.

The UH-1D could also be armed with M60D 7.62mm or

M213 .50 Cal. pintle-mounted

door guns on the M59 armament subsystem.

From: Lzalbany65

To: theveteran@vva.org

Subj: FRAUD= FREEMAN, ED W, Crandall dont deserve

Medal of Honor, His Huey had 2 M-60 machine guns

& 2 door gunners.

Moore told them when it was safe to land.

If he said it was safe to land they did.

If they were told it wasnt safe to land they

didnt.

Medevac Hueys were landing on X-Ray on the 14th,

A CH-47 even picked up the Naplamed Troops.

Crandall, Freemen's Company was the only company that could fly into X-Ray,as they were the Organic, support Aviation company attached to Moore.

After Moore closed X-Ray, Crandall grounded his company and only he and Freemen, Later in the day 2 other Pilots flew all missions.

Then they complaned the were tired from flying all Day 14 missions.

Crandall's Company had 24 Hueys, of the 14 missions 14 Pilots and crews could have gotten combat experence, but then only Crandall, Freemen got all the experence.

All other AirCraft would be barred from entering the Battle area, As they weren part of the Battle group.

To: Benrand ...This particular Naplam Victim died within a

day and that just crushed Landing Zone X-Ray's

UPI War Correspondent Joe Galloway (BARRY

PEPPER).

...I will NEVER FORGET being ordered to go into

that CH-47 Chinook Helicopter fresh from LZ X-Ray

at IA DRANG-1965's Landing Zone Falcon to try and

identify those young Soldiers who had already

been Killed in Action by our own Napalm. NEVER. 30 posted on 03/15/2002 8:01:05 PM PST by ALOHA RONNIE< Ronnie Guyer

ALOHA RONNIE Guyer-Vet/Battle of IA DRANG1965

http://www.lzxray.com/guyer_collection.htm

CH-47's were picked up the wounded from X-Ray and

taking them to Falcon on the 14th

Nov 1965.

To: Benrand

...This particular Naplam Victim died within a day and that just crushed Landing Zone X-

Ray's UPI War Correspondent Joe Galloway (BARRY PEPPER).

..."I will NEVER FORGET being ordered to go into

that CH-47 Chinook Helicopter fresh from

LZ X-Ray at IA DRANG-1965's Landing Zone Falcon

to try and identify those young Soldiers

who had already been Killed in Action by our own

Napalm. NEVER".

After refueling, the fourth lift went in at 1332H.

At 1338H the second wave started receiving ground fire.

>>>After this lift was complete, a medevac ship

brought in the Bn Surgeon's team which

reported they already had 20 to 25 WIA's and some

KIA's.

After refueling, the fourth lift went in at 1332H.

At 1338H the second wave started receiving ground fire.

>>>After this lift was complete, a medevac ship brought in the Bn Surgeon's team which

reported they already had 20 to 25 WIA's and some KIA's.

A/229 AVN 1 CAV was a US Army unit

B/229 AVN 1 CAV was a US Army unit

1/9 CAV 1 CAV was a US Army unit

1/7 CAV 1 CAV was a US Army unit

Primary service involved, US Army

Pleiku Province, II Corps, South Vietnam

Location, LZ X-Ray

Description: 0?H 2 A/229th Avn UH-1D's and 2 UH-1B's make a recon flight from Plei Me to Duc Co

and identify 3 possible LZs.

0?H 5 CH-47A's start moving 6 105mm guns to LZ Falcon.

0?H 1/9th Cav Scouts conduct a VR of 2 LZs and the surrounding area.

0852H LZ X-Ray is selected.

By 0930 all 16 A/229th Avn UH-1D's arrive at Plei Me for the CA.

C/2/20th ARA provided support all that day.

1048H the first lift of 8 UH-1Ds landed in X-Ray, the second wave follwed immediately.

1120H the second lift went in.

The 1/7th C&C ship landed at 1140H to extract the NVA POW. <<

1210H the third lift went in and at 1215H contact was made to begin the Battle of LZ X-Ray.

After refueling, the fourth lift went in at 1332H.

At 1338H the second wave started receiving ground fire.

After this lift was complete, a medevac ship brought in the Bn Surgeon's team which

reported they already had 20 to 25 WIA's and some KIA's.

At 1400 the USAF Spad crashed and ARA fire was directed on the NVA moving around the

aircraft.

At 1430 the fifth lift went in and the LZ suddenly turned red-hot.

The Hueys dropped off troops and extracted KIAs and WIAs.

Because the first wave received such heavy fire and took so many hits, the 1/7th cancelled

the second wave.

Two Hueys were dispatched to Camp Holloway to collect ammo.

Two Hueys loaded all the remaining 1/7th ammo at Plei Me and returned to X-Ray.

They extracted 13 WIAs and KIAs on this trip.

The two Hueys from Holloway returned and went into X-Ray, one was shot down in X-Ray

and the crew extracted.

A/229th continued to fly in ammo and extract casualties.

Instead of flying the WIAs all the way to Pleiku, they used LZ Falcon as a transfer point to

the medevac ships.

After three two ship missions, all of A/229th set up a shuttle flying in ammo and water,

taking out casualties.

At 1520H they started bringing in the last of the 1/7th Cav two ships at a time.

A second Huey went down in X-Ray.

Comments: MAJ Crandall, Bruce; A/229th Avn CO; ; CPT Mills, Jon; A/229th Avn pilot; ;

CPT Rickard, ; 1/9th Cav scout leader; ; CWO Lombardo, Riccardo J.; A/229th Avn AC; ;

1LT Bean, Roger K.; A/229th Avn pilot; ; CPT Freeman, Ed; A/229th Avn flight leader; ; CPT

Mesch, Gene; A/229th Avn AC; ; CWO Jekel, Alex S.; A/229th Avn AC; ; MAJ

Bartholomew, Roger J.; C/2/20th ARA CO; ; CPT Washburn, Richard B.; C/2/20th ARA

pilot; ; CPT Winkel, Paul P.; A/229th Avn flight leader; ; CWO Harper, Dallas H.; A/229th

Avn AC; ; CWO Faba, Ken; A/229th Avn AC; ; CWO Komich, Leland C.; A/229th Avn pilot;

; CWO Schramm, Walter; A/229th Avn pilot; ; CWO Estes, Donald C; A/229th Avn AC;

What happend to the XO???

Crandall, "Freemen and I shouldnt be together ( Flying the ammo ), Incase we got shot

down he would be needed to lead the company"

Crandall the CO, Freemen the 1st Platoon leader

They delivered troops, ammunition and water and brought out the dead and wounded.

Col. Moore closed LZ X-Ray. >need time closed or Lift<. Crandall, Freemen flew 14

Missions. < 1hour flight time @110 knots to >Pleiku 40 miles< Tea Plantation 32 miles( Brigiad HeadQuaters Ammo< and return to X-Ray. < How many flight's to >Falcon 5

miles<. what was their A Hour for Crandall, Freemem? Refuling

point's?

As you see they couldnt have flown 14 missions on the Nov 14, 1965

Crandall the Commanding Officer.

Freemen the 1st Platoon leader.

They Ground the rest of their company 20 Huey's and crew's of 4 troops and Flew 14

Mission's themselvs, from Military time 0600 hrs> civilian time 6:00am.

Till 2200 hrs, 10:00pm

They allowed 2 more Huey's to help. what time ??

They were so exashasted when they shut their huey's down at 1000hrs.

Each Huey Crew could have flown 1 mission each and got combat experiance, Instead they

got none.

Crandall's, Freemen POOR Leadership robbed them of thet experiaence by flying all

missions that day.

They Degraded their aircrews preformance the following days, leaving no Huey's to fly the

2/7, 1/5 out of LZ X-Ray on the 17th.

Feild Manual 57-35 Airmobile Operations 1963

Aircrew endurance must be considered.

For planning purposes, the Air Assault Task Force Commander should consider eight hours

a day and four hours of night flying to be a safe limit for aircrews.

If those limits are exceeded during a single period, then degraded aircrew performance can

be expected on the following days.

Remarks by Bruce Crandall - Commander of the helicopters in the IA Drang Valley.

Known by his call sign “Ancient Serpent Six” and several variations of it,

into the firestorm of Landing Zone X-Ray at the Battle of IA Drang in November 1965.

He and his men( Freemen and 2 other Huey crew's ) the rest of the unit were grounded by

Crandall, Moore. delivered troops, ammunition and water and brought out the dead and

wounded.

He and his good friend, Congressional Medal of Honor Winner Ed “Too Tall to Fly” Freemen,

claimed the toughest jobs for themselves, risking their lives repeatedly.

Crandall’s actions at X-Ray have been immortalized in the major motion picture “We Were

Soldiers”, directed by Randall Wallace and starring Mel Gibson as Lt. Colonel Hal Moore

and Greg Kinnear as Major Crandall.

He won the first Helicopter Heroism Award of the Aviation/Space Writers Association, for

two daring nighttime landings under fire to rescue 12 badly wounded soldiers from Captain

Tony Nadal’s Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry in Operation Masher-White Wing in

January 1966. During his two tours in Vietnam Crandall flew lead ship on 756 separate

missions.

Crandall the CO, Freemen 1st Platoon leader.( Whaty happend to the XO? ).

They delivered troops, ammunition and water and brought out the dead and wounded.

Col. Moore closed LZ X-Ray. >need time closed or Lift<. Crandall, Freemen flew 14

Missions. < 1hour flight time @110 knots to >Pleiku 40 miles< Tea Plantation 32 miles

( Brigaid HeadQuaters Ammo< and return to X-Ray. < How many flight's to >Falcon 5

miles<. what was their A Hour for Crandall, Freemem? Refuling

point's?

As you see they couldnt have flown 14 missions on the Nov 14, 1965

Crandall the Commanding Officer.

Freemen the Executive Officer.

They Ground the rest of their company. 20 Huey's and crew's of 4 troops and Flew 14

Mission's themselvs, from Military time 0600 hrs> civilian time 6:00am.

Till 2200 hrs, 10:00pm

They were so exashasted when they shut their huey's down at 1000hrs.

Each Huey Crew could have flown 1 mission each and got combat experiance, Instead they

got none.

Crandall's, Freemen POOR Leadership robbed them of thet experiaence by flying all

missions that day.

They Degraded their aircrews preformance the following days, leaving no Huey's to fly the

2/7, 1/5 out of LZ X-Ray on the 17th.

Feild Manual 57-35 Airmobile Operations 1963

Aircrew endurance must be considered.

For planning purposes, the Air Assault Task Force Commander should consider eight hours

a day and four hours of night flying to be a safe limit for aircrews.

If those limits are exceeded during a single period, then degraded aircrew performance can

be expected on the following days.

ED W. FREEMAN Captain Company A, 229 Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division Ia Drang Valley, Republic of Vietnam 14 November 1965 Captain Ed W. Freeman, United States Army, distinguished himself by numerous acts of conspicuous gallantry and extraordinary intrepidity on 14 November 1965 while serving with Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). As a flight leader and second in command of a 16-helicopter lift unit, he supported a heavily engaged American infantry battalion at Landing Zone X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley, Republic of Vietnam. The unit was almost out of ammunition after taking some of the heaviest casualties of the war, fighting off a relentless attack from a highly motivated, heavily armed enemy force. When the infantry commander closed the helicopter landing zone due to intense direct enemy fire, Captain Freeman risked his own life by flying his unarmed helicopter through a gauntlet of enemy fire time after time, delivering critically needed ammunition, water and medical supplies to the besieged battalion. His flights had a direct impact on the battle's outcome by providing the engaged units with timely supplies of ammunition critical to their survival, without which they would almost surely have gone down, with much greater loss of life. After medical evacuation helicopters refused to fly into the area due to intense enemy fire, Captain Freeman flew 14 separate rescue missions, providing life-saving evacuation of an estimated 30 seriously wounded soldiers -- some of whom would not have survived had he not acted. All flights were made into a small emergency landing zone within 100 to 200 meters of the defensive perimeter where heavily committed units were perilously holding off the attacking elements. Captain Freeman's selfless acts of great valor, extraordinary perseverance and intrepidity were far above and beyond the call of duty or mission and set a superb example of leadership and courage for all of his peers. Captain Freeman's extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit and the United States Army.

On 14 November 1965, he commanded the helicopters involved in supporting the 1/7th Cavalry's assault into LZ X-Ray in the IaDrang Valley campaign. This battle was the first meeting of an American battalion-sized unit against a far larger force of Vietnamese Regular Army troops. It was arguably the fiercest battle of the whole war and resulted in the most casualties suffered by units on both sides. Crandall's contributions can best be described by Lt General Harold G. Moore (the LTC and Battlefield Commander of the Infantry units in X-Ray) when he wrote in his book "We Were Soldiers Once and Young".

Then Major, Crandall and his wingman, then Captain, Ed W. Freeman (who later received the Medal of Honor for his actions) flew a total of 22 missions into X-Ray, 14 of which were voluntary ammunition, medical resupply and medical evacuation flights. Twelve of these fourteen were made after the Med Evac unit responsible for evacuating casualties refused to enter the intensely hot landing zone. Crandall's helicopters evacuated more than 75 casualties during a flight day that started at 0600 hours and ended at 2230 hours, more than 16 hours later.

BIOGRAPHY OF BRUCE P. CRANDALL Then Major Bruce P. Crandall was assigned as Commanding Officer of "A" Company, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in the Republic of Vietnam in 1965-66. In this position, he had command of 20 UH- I (Huey) helicopters and flew the lead helicopter on over 750 combat missions, leading as many as 60 lift helicopters plus their gunship and aerial rocket artillery support helicopters on air assaults in the central highlands of RVN. In addition to these flights, he volunteered and flew a number of medical evacuation rescue flights which he undertook after the Medical Evacuation Unit responsible for these missions refused to fly due to the, intense enemy fire in the pick-up zones. Two of these volunteer missions, 14 November 1965 and 31 January 1966 received special recognition. The November 1965 missions into LZ X-Ray in the IaDrang Valley was recognized in a number of books written on the battle including We Were Soldiers Once and Young written by Lt General Harold G. Moore, Commanding Officer of the Infantry units in X-Ray; and, Joseph Galloway, a combat reporter who was in the LZ during the battle. (There is currently a movie in production of this book.) Crandall led the helicopter operations during this fierce battle which was the first meeting between a major force of North Vietnamese Regulars and a battalion-sized U.S. military unit. The January 1966 rescue was recognized by the Aviation and Space Writers Association for their first "Helicopter Heroism Award". This rescue was selected from an international field of nominees, both military and civilian, as the outstanding act of heroism involving a helicopter. At the twentieth anniversary of this award, the organization ranked Crandall's rescue as the most outstanding in the 20 years of the award. Crandall was also inducted into the elite "Gathering of Eagles" by the United States Air Force in 1996. He is one of only seven Army aviators so honored. The Gathering of Eagles is the only international organization dedicated to recognizing outstanding achievements relating to both civilian and military aviation throughout the world.

Bruce Crandall was born and raised in Olympia, Washington. He graduated from Olympia High School in 1951 and was a high school All State/All American baseball player that year. In January 1953 he was drafted into the Army. He was commissioned in 1954 from Engineer Officers Candidate School and went directly to fixed wing flight school. Subsequent to that he went through helicopter flight school. His flying assignments during the next eight years were mapping missions which included tours in the Arctic, in the desert of North Africa and in the jungles of Central and South America. His ground assignments were as Commanding Officer of Combat Engineer Companies on two separate occasions during this period. In 1963, he was reassigned to the 11th Air Assault Division at Ft Benning where he spent the next two years helping develop the helicopter air assault procedures and doctrine later followed in Vietnam by units he led there. In early 1965 he was sent to the Dominican Republic as the senior staff officer and Liaison officer to the XVIII Airborne Corps for the Division's helicopters attached to the expeditionary forces in that action. Upon returning to Ft Benning, his Division was redesignated the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and he deployed to Vietnam as Commanding Officer of A Company, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division. In this position, he commanded a unit with 20 lift helicopters supporting combat assaults for 13 months in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. During the year he flew the lead helicopter on over 750 missions involving as many of 60 lift ships and a number of gun and rocket support helicopters. He also volunteered and flew a number of medical evacuation missions when Med Evac pilots refused to go because of intense enemy fire in the pick-up zones. Crandall's most noted flights were those that took place on 14 November 1965 and on 31 January 1966.

On 31 January 1966, Crandall had just finished a flight day supporting the 1/1 2th Infantry Battalion who was heavily engaged on the Bong Son Plain along the central coast of Vietnam At dusk, en route to refuel and to shut down for the night, he was informed that "X' Company of the 1/7th, a unit he frequently supported, was in heavy contact and had a number of wounded that prevented them from breaking contact and maneuvering to a more secure area. Crandall refueled and decided to fly to the area and see if he could help By now it was pitch dark with an overcast sky which made flight difficult. He found the area because of the heavy explosions and tracer fire. He contacted the Infantry Commander Captain Tony Nadal, his friend and a fellow veteran of X-Ray and learned he had 12 seriously wounded that needed evacuation and that he had a very limited pick-up zone surrounded by trees on three sides. He also learned that Mod Evac had refused the flight during daylight hours and that the Infantry now held only a very small perimeter. The wounded were located in the center of the area where the helicopter would have to WW. Crandall's Battalion Commander, LTC Robert Kellar, was overhead in his Command Helicopter with the Infantry Brigade Commander, Colonel Harold G. Moore. They broke in on the radio to warn Crandall not to attempt the rescue if he wasn't real confident he could do so safely. They warned they did not want a helicopter downed to add to their problems that night. Crandall decided to attempt the rescue himself; in two flights, evacuating six each time. He also decided to do so without the use of search or landing lights in order to give the enemy less of a target for his aircraft but more importantly, so as not to backlight the troopers defending the perimeter and spot fighting the wounded where he was landing. He decided to land to a flashlight that he asked the Infantry Commander to put in the center of the touchdown area. He intended to approach straight down on to the flashlight in order to minimize his chances of striking the unseen trees. He had to abort his first approach when the light was turned off due to enemy fire. Captain Nadal took control of the flashlight and the next landing under intense enemy fire was successful. Crandall made a second lift under the same conditions as the first and successfully rescued 12 wounded.

Crandall received the Aviation and Space Writers Association Helicopter Heroism Award for the year 1966 for this rescue. At the 20th annual award ceremony for the award, his flights were ranked as number one over the first 20 years. Crandall was also nominated as the Army Aviator of the Year from the 1st Cavalry Division.

UH-1 Huey Helicopter The most widely used military helicopter, the Bell UH-1 series Iroquois, better known as the

"Huey", began arriving in Vietnam in 1963.

Before the end of the conflict, more than 5,000 of these versatile aircraft were introduced into Southeast Asia.

"Hueys" were used for MedEvac, command and control, and air assault; to transport

personnel and materiel; and as gun ships.

Considered to be the most widely used helicopter in the world, with more than 9,000 produced from the 1950s to the present, the Huey is flown today by about 40 countries.

Bell (model 205) UH-1D (1963) had a longer fuselage than previous models, increased rotor

diameter, increased range, and a more powerful Lycoming T53-L-11 1100 shp engine, with

growth potential to the Lycoming T53-L-13 1400 shp engine.

A distinguishing characteristic is the larger cargo doors, with twin cabin windows, on each

side.

>>The UH-1D, redesigned to carry up to 12 troops, with a crew of two, reached Vietnam in

1963. <<

The UH-1D has a range of 293 miles (467km) and a speed of 127 mph (110 knots).

UH-1Ds were build under license in Germany.

UH-1D "Hueys" could be armed with M60D door guns, quad M60Cs on the M6 aircraft

armament subsystem, 20mm cannon, 2.75 inch rocket launchers, 40mm grenade launcher

in M5 helicopter chin-turret, and up to six NATO Standard AGM-22B (formerly SS-11B) wire-

guided anti-tank missiles on the M11 or M22 guided missile launcher.

The UH-1D could also be armed with M60D 7.62mm or M213 .50 Cal. pintle-mounted door

guns on the M59 armament subsystem.

Remarks by Bruce Crandall - Commander of the helicopters in the IA Drang Valley.

Known by his call sign “Ancient Serpent Six” and several variations of it, Crandall led some of the bravest helicopter pilots in the world into the firestorm of Landing Zone X-Ray at the Battle of IA Drang in November 1965.

He and his men delivered troops, ammunition and water and brought out the dead and

wounded.

>>He and his good friend, Congressional Medal of Honor Winner Ed “Too Tall to Fly”

Freemen, claimed the toughest jobs for themselves, risking their lives repeatedly. <<

Crandall and Freemens actions dosent meet the

standard for the Medal Of Honor.

THREE MEDAL's OF HONOR the highest Medel for one

Battle?? FOR 1 BATTLE.

SOMETHING IS WRONG FOR THAT AMOUNT OF HIGH MEDALS.

Date: 5/14/2003 12:31:57 PM Pacific Daylight Time From: Lzalbany65 To: senator@sessions.senate.gov

Subj: FRAUD= FREEMAN, ED W, Crandall dont deserve Medal of Honor, His Huey had 2 M-60 Date: 5/14/2003 12:30:43 PM Pacific Daylight Time From: Lzalbany65 To: john_mccain@mccain.senate.gov

Subj: ural to Moore's after action report, Medevac huey's were landing X-Ray on the 14 Date: 5/13/2003 1:20:40 AM Pacific Daylight Time From: Lzalbany65 To: Xav8er

I thought I would let you know 1st about Moore, Galloway, Crandall all LIERS,

Freeman was their DUPE.

ural to Moore's after action Report, and Opreation Order For Nov. 14, 1965 http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/history/aar-xray.pdf

Moore's after action Report LZ X-Ray Nov 14,1965 page 7 Par E-1 near bottom of page

NOV 14 1965 Moore "I did not call in the Med evac Helicopter too frenquently"

so the Med evac Huey's did and were landing on the 14 Nov 1965.

Who ever put them in for the Medal of Honer is a LIER.

Med evac Helicopters were LANDING at X-Ray.

Moore called Crandall and Freeman to land when fire on X-Ray was light.

Crandall and Freeman's unit were the only one's that could land at X-Ray.

Crandall grounded his unit, only crandall, Freeman flew mission's.

Crandall abandonded his aircraft, and flew as Co-Pilot to Freeman.

Crandall was required to pick up wounded troops< FM 7-20, FM 57-35

Moore should have been charged with Mansalughter, Deriliction of Duty( He didnt know what he was doing ). His Operation Order show's that.

After the battle Crandall, Moore and Mill's went to an Officer's Bar, after Moore wouldnt be served and was ask to leave, Moore then said he was going to KILL everyone in the Bar AMERICAN TROOPS.

Crandall, Mill's took their pistols out of their holsters and placed them on the Bar Moore placed his Rifle on the Bar.

the Bartender ran to get the Officer of the Day and came back to the bar.

a clear violation of art 128 UCMJ.

Crandall he volunteered and flew a number of medical evacuation rescue flights which he undertook after the Medical Evacuation Unit responsible for these missions refused to fly due to the, intense enemy fire in the pick-up zones. Two of these volunteer missions, 14 November 1965

He also volunteered and flew a number of medical evacuation missions when Med Evac pilots refused to go because of intense enemy fire in the pick-up zones.

Crandall's most noted flights were those that took place on 14 November 1965 and on 31 January 1966.

After medical evacuation helicopters refused to fly into the area. FALSE

med evac were landing on the 14th, Moores after action report page 7 paragraph E-1

by flying his unarmed helicopter through a gauntlet of enemy fire.

FALSE he had two doorgunners armed with M-60 machineguns.

Supporting , Organtic air craft can be ued as transpot of wounded troops. FM 57-35, FM 7-20

Medal of Honor

FREEMAN, ED W.

Rank and organization: Captain, U.S. Army, Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion,

First Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

Place and date: Ia Drang Valley, Republic of Vietnam, 14 November 1965

Born: 1928

Citation:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. Captain Ed W. Freeman, United States Army, distinguished himself by numerous acts of conspicuous gallantry and extraordinary intrepidity

on 14 November, 1965, while serving with Company

A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, First Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

As a flight leader and second in command of a 16-helicopter lift unit, he supported a heavily engaged American infantry battalion at landing zone X-ray in the Ia Drang Valley, Republic of Vietnam. The infantry unit was almost out of ammunition, after taking some of the heaviest casualties of the war, fighting off a relentless attack from a highly motivated, heavily armed enemy force. When the infantry commander closed the helicopter landing zone, due to intense direct enemy fire, Captain Freeman risked his own life by flying his unarmed helicopter through a gauntlet of enemy fire, time after time, delivering critically needed ammunition, water and medical supplies to the underseige battalion. His flights had a direct impact on the battle's outcome by providing the engaged units with timely supplies of ammunition critical to their survival without which they would almost surely have experienced a much greater loss of life.

After medical evacuation helicopters refused to fly into the area, due to intense enemy fire,

Captain Freeman flew 14 separate rescue missions, providing life- saving evacuation of an estimates 30 seriously wounded soldiers, some of whom would not have survived, had he not acted.All flights were made into a small emergency landing zone within 100 to 200 meters of the defensive perimeter where heavily committed units were perilously holding off the attacking elements. Captain Freeman's selfless acts of great valor, extraordinary perseverance and intrepidity were far above and beyond the call of duty or mission and set a superb example of leadership and courage for all of his peers. Captain Freeman's extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit and the United States Army.

Russell. L. Ross 1741 Maysong ct San Jose, CA 95131-2727

Ph 408 926-9336

The Book We Were Soldiers Once and Young is Fiction X-Ray part. as was the Movie We Were Soldiers

Crandall dosent like Troops with PTSD

Subj: Re: ural to Moore's after action report, Medevac huey's were landing X-Ray on... Date: 5/13/2003 11:31:12 AM Pacific Daylight Time From: Xav8er To: Lzalbany65

My wife did not want me to respond to this tirade primarily because she thought you must be someone who is under medical treatment or is suffering from some sort of mental stress.

I, on the other hand, am curious as to who you are and what experience you have had that causes you to make such wild and untrue accusations.

There is no question that the claims you made are totally untrue. I will be happy to address and refute each and every one of your so called "facts" if and when I can learn your motivation; your involvement in the action; and, whether you are under medical care.

If you have mental problems it will be of absolutely no value to respond to your harrange.

If you need medical help, I urge you to seek it.

One point that even you should understand, the book has been out for quite a few years and, to my knowledge, you are the first to question the facts relating to the 1st Cav's Med Evac units lack of flights into X-Ray or at any other hot LZ during that time period.

The 15th Med had a policy that they followed that an LZ had to be "green" (no enemy fire for a minimum of 5 minutes). ====================================================== @@ If this is true 5 minutes then Moore's time line of the story of the battle is False. ============================= They followed that policy for at least the first 2 years they were in country.

Certainly the many pilots who flew in that outfit during X-Ray, the Ia Drang and later would have commented (denied) any such claim of their failure to perform their assigned rescue missions, were it not true.

I strongly suggest to you that in the future you refrain from calling people "LIERS" ( correct spelling is "liars") before you have the facts and before you ddisplay the courage to give them the courtesy of first contacting them with your charges and/or concerns.

Subj: Re: I'm 80% PTSD Date: 5/13/2003 7:52:41 PM Pacific Daylight Time From: Xav8er To: Lzalbany65

Do not send me any more of your babble. Get help for your obsessions.

Galloway didnt Rescue Jimmy and his BRONZ STAR should be stripped from him.

Friend's getting Friend Medals.

Needs to be invesegated False statements by all of them Moore, Galloway, Crandall.

Harold G. MOORE and Joseph L. Galloway " THe Book, and Movie are

85% historical fact and

15% dramatic embellishment."<== FICTION

According to the authors of the book the movie is considered to be 85% historical fact and 15% dramatic embellishment.

poka_wolf

Posted: Tue Apr 22, 2003 3:57 pm Post subject: Class projest

I am a student at the University of Idaho in Moscow Idaho. I am currently enrolled in a history class. Our professor just gave us an assignment to watch any movie relating to an historical event and to do research on the event to see how accurate it is. The movie i selected is "We Were Soldiers." If possible is there anyway to contact Joe Galloway, Hal Moore, or any other individuals that were present for the battle. I also need any other forms of information anyone can give me.

http://www.thealamofilm.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=976&sid=35567227129138c61de90ba33c397353

85% historical fact and 15% dramatic embellishment

According to the authors of the book the movie is considered to be 85% historical fact and 15% dramatic embellishment.

poka_wolf

Posted: Sun Apr 27, 2003 4:18 am Post subject: rough draft of paper

Sorry this project is only a page and a quarter.

I was told in class i had only a page to write and i had a 13 page paper.

But i am keeping all my info since i plan on doing a full research paper on this at a later time.

Again that you for all the help i have received from eveyone.

Hollywood Presents An Officer’s History

The movie “We Were Soldiers” when looked at historically comes to light as an officer’s account of the incident.

After watching the movie a case can easily be made for the fact that some of the details have been dramatized for entertainment value.

From an officer’s point of view the main sequencing of events in the movie happened in the following order: deployment to Vietnam immediately after training, helicopter insertion at Ia Drang, ambushed by north Vietnamese troops and battle commenced, ground troops call for a heavy air strike,

the 7th Calvary captures hill and ends the engagement.

The argument for the fact that this is an officer’s point of view is based off of research that I have done including personal interview, emails, and other correspondence with retired military personnel that were present at the actual battle of Ia Drang.

After reviewing my research I found that this movie was based on a book about the battle called

“ We Were Soldiers….Once and Young” written by General Hal Moore (retired) and Joe Galloway.

According to the authors of the book the movie is considered to be 85% historical fact and 15% dramatic embellishment.

At the time of the battle Joe Galloway was a UPI Correspondent assigned to cover the war and then LTC Moore was the commanding Officer of the 1st division of the 7th Calvary.

A Majority of the officers that I corresponded with agreed with the authors’ characterization of the movie.

In Joe Galloway’s opinion, “Which is the reverse of normal for folks in Hollywood so we are pleased at how well it came out.”

While the few enlisted personnel that I talked to disagree with the movies presentation of the battle these opinions appear to be in the minority.

If you keep in mind the point of view of the authors of the manuscript this movie can be considered to be historically accurate

SABER Posted: Wed Apr 23, 2003 4:32 pm Post subject:

You should get a copy of the book We Were Soldiers Once and Young, the first part of the book deals with LZ X-ray. This is the portion that the movie was based upon.

In general most of us who were there say the movie is 75-80% history with the rest being "Hollywood".

The incidents in the movie are based for the most part on real events.

Two notable exceptions; the command post of the battalion never had North Vietnamese soldiers attacking through it and the charge up the hill (ala Braveheart) to rout the NVA never happened.

acker1 Posted: Wed Apr 23, 2003 11:31 pm Post subject:

Try this site & scroll down for email link to Joe Galloway: http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/special_packages/galloway/

I agree with sabre about 75-80% history.

Remember also that some of the characters in the movie are composites of the people that were there. Would heve been hard to tell the stories of everyone there. Good luck in your project

Ia Drang vet--Recon 2/7 Pointman into LZALBANY http://ackerman.irvamerica.com

In a message dated 1/15/2004 3:23:36 PM Pacific Standard Time, jgalloway@krwashington.com writes:

like i say russell, if you had anything worth taking i would sue you for libel and slander and take it all. but you don't. only a couple bottles of blue pills which you need to use more regularly.

Forwarded Message: Subj: RE: My web Page is now on the 1st page of Joseph L. GallowayWe Were Soldiers=FICTION Date: 1/15/2004 3:23:36 PM Pacific Standard Time From: jgalloway@krwashington.com To: LZXRAY111765@aol.com Sent from the Internet (Details)

like i say russell, if you had anything worth taking i would sue you for libel and slander and take it all. but you don't. only a couple bottles of blue pills which you need to use more regularly.

KnightRidder Washington Bureau, Joe Galloway, We Were Soldiers FICTION

KnightRidder's Military Consultant Joe Galloway

never served in the Military.

In a message dated 1/15/2004 3:23:36 PM Pacific

Standard Time,

jgalloway@krwashington.com writes:<Joseph L. Galloway

like i say russell, if you had anything worth

taking i would sue you for libel and slander and

take it all. but you don't. only a couple bottles

of blue pills which you need to use more

regularly.

like i say russell, if you had anything worth taking i would sue you for libel and slander and take it all. but you don't. only a couple bottles of blue pills which you need to use more regularly.

Russell L. Ross 1741 Maysong ct San Jose, CA. 95131-2727 408 926-9336

Below "IF YOU WANT A GOOD FIGHT...." Soldier Of Fortune September 1983 vol.8 no.9 page 22-29.

This is the 2nd Rewrite of We Were Soldiers Once and Young, I,m still looking for the 1st, In the 1st. verson Galloway writes Col. Moore was told to stay out of the mountains. I will pay up to $100.00 or more for that article. It was in Military type Magzine, like Soldier Of Fortune also.

BY JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY KnightRidder's Military Consultant.

JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY, PLAGERIST, LIAR, CONMAN.

JOE GALLOWAY<< Never WORE a Uniform,

No Military training at all. Back to Home > News > Iraq: The Aftermath >

Monday, Jan 05, 2004

Joe Galloway

Joe Galloway "Not just Rumsfeld,

but all of his "civilian experts" who never wore

a uniform."

<<( What Joe Galloway is a CIVILIAN Who never

wore a uniform )

Posted on Wed, Sep. 24, 2003

How to ruin a great army? See Donald Rumsfeld

By JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY

Knight Ridder Newspapers

WASHINGTON - Armies are fragile institutions, and for all their might, easily broken.

It took the better part of 20 years to rebuild the Army from the wreckage of Vietnam. With the hard work of a generation of young officers, blooded in Vietnam and determined that the mistake would never be repeated, a new Army rose Phoenix-like from the ashes of the old, now perhaps the finest Army in history.

In just over two years, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and his civilian aides have done just about everything they could to destroy that Army.

How will they explain to history the mistakes that threaten to weaken a great nation even as it seeks ways to win the war on terrorism it has declared?

How do you break an army?

You can work it to death.

Under Rumsfeld, by next spring 30 of the Army's 33 combat brigades will either be in Iraq or on their way home from Iraq. Some of them will come home from Iraq and head almost immediately to Afghanistan or Bosnia or South Korea or the Sinai Desert. More than 20,000 Army Reservists and National Guardsmen will be finishing one-year tours in Iraq, and thousands more will be called up to do their year. How many will be willing to re-enlist if they're faced with endless deployments on thankless missions in the far reaches of empire?

You can neglect its training and education.

With an operations tempo this high, there's little time for units to do much more than repair their equipment and send their soldiers home on leave with long-neglected families before it's time to deploy again.

There's no time for divisions to rotate to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif., to maneuver their Abrams tanks and Bradleys and train to win the wars. There's no time for non-commissioned officers - the sergeants who are the backbone of any great army - to go to the schools they need to get better at their jobs and earn promotions.

The Army began to break in Vietnam when the senior NCO's, the grizzled old sergeants who'd seen combat in World War II and Korea and survived one or two tours in Vietnam, were ordered back yet again and chose to retire instead. Or went back and were killed. In their place came 90-day wonders - young draftees selected straight out of basic training, run through a short course and shipped to Vietnam to be buck sergeant squad leaders.

You can politicize the Army promotion system for three- and four-star generals.

Rumsfeld and his civilian aides such as Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith and his military handmaidens have intruded deeply and harmfully into the way the services promote their leaders.

Where once the Army would send up its nominee for a vacant billet, now it must send up two or three candidates who must run the gantlet of personal interviews in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Not just Rumsfeld, but all of his civilian

experts who never wore a uniform.< Galloway never

wore a Uniform either.

A Galloway is Civilian who can only Parrots what

a Military Troop tells him about things in the

Military.

Galloway apprently thins he can do a better

Job.>>

What hoops must the successful one jump through? Will it be the tough, bright candidate who's unafraid to speak when he sees mistakes being made? Or will it be the buttoned-down, willow-in-the-wind, can-do yes-man? Your basic Oliver North?

You can decide that you've discovered a newer, cheaper way of fighting and winning America's wars.

Rumsfeld and company have embraced, on the basis of a fleeting success in Afghanistan and a flawed success in Iraq, a theory that all that's needed to win our wars is air power and small bands of Special Operations troops. Stealth bombers and snake-eaters.

On the strength of this, they've refused all pleas for an urgently needed increase in the strength of an Army that has been whittled down to pre-World War II levels of 485,000 soldiers. They still deny that there's a guerrilla war raging in Iraq, where 130,000 American soldiers are trying to keep the peace in a nation the size of California with 25 million people. Because reinforcement would be an admission that Rumsfeld and company were wrong in their belief that war would end quickly, their hand-picked Iraqi exiles would take over and the soldiers would come home in a few months.

Another defense secretary who could not admit he'd erred was Robert Strange McNamara, who, like Rumsfeld, was recruited from corporate America. By the time he did, it was too late.

ABOUT THE WRITER

Joseph L. Galloway is the senior military correspondent for Knight Ridder Newspapers and co-author of the national best-seller "We Were Soldiers Once ... and Young."

Readers may write to him at:

jgalloway@krwashington.com.

CODE OF KNIGHTRIDDER"S WASHINGTON BUREAU CORRESPONDENTS AFTER BEING SENT E-MAIL ABOUT JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY PHONEY STORY "WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE AND YOUNG, AND NEVER SAVED JIMMY "

KNIGHTRIDDER'S WASHINGTON BUREAU CORRESPONDENTS COMMENT("ooooooo").

JOE GALLOWAY Military Consultant KnightRidder Washington Bureau Joseph L. Galloway, the co-author of the best-selling book, "We Were Soldiers Once ... and Young," has joined Knight Ridder's war coverage team as a consultant. Joe started his career at the Victoria (Texas) Daily Advocate, then worked for UPI in Kansas City and Topeka (where he was statehouse bureau chief at 19) before he went overseas as bureau chief or regional manager in Tokyo (twice), Vietnam (three times), Jakarta, New Delhi, Singapore, Moscow and Los Angeles. Joe served three tours in Vietnam for UPI, beginning in early 1965, and he's the only civilian to have been awarded the Bronze Star by the U.S. Army during that war. He was decorated for rescuing wounded American soldiers under heavy enemy fire during the battle at Landing Zone X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley on Nov. 15, 1965. At U.S. News, his cover story on the battle at LZ X-Ray, published in late 1990, was awarded the National Magazine Award. E-mail Joe at jgalloway@krwashington.com

WHEN MR. GALLOWAY IS READY TO PROVE THAT WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE AND YOUNG CONTAINS NO FICTION IN A COURT OF LAW, AS OF NOW HE'S AFRAID TO DO ANYTHING, IF HE DOES HIS PHONEY LIFE WILL BE EXPOSED. THE GLOVE HAS BEEN CAST DOWN, MR. GALLOWAY IS A PLAGERIST,LIAR, SOME OF HIS PICTURES OF LZ X-RAY HAVE BEEN ALTERED TO MATCH THE STORY "WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE AND YOUNG,"

Joseph L. Galloway didnt rescue Jimmy and the Bronz Star should be taken from him.

Joseph L. Galloway "Jimmy was wearing NYLON Combat Boots", these were never issued to the 1st Cavalry Division when they Deployed to Vietnam in 1965.

So Mr. Galloway anytime you ready to prove We Were Soldiers isnt Fiction, I'm ready to prove that it is.

Persons below were sent E-Mail about Joe Galloway' Plagersim and Fiction. EDITORS Clark Hoyt Washington Editor Mark Seibel Managing Editor International John Walcott Bureau Chief Beryl Adcock News Desk Chief Frank Greve Consumer Affairs & Science Editor Robert A. Rankin Government & Politics Editor Renee Schoof National Security Editor Steve Butler Foreign Editor James Asher Investigative Editor Crystal Davis Night Editor Tish Wells Web Editor NATIONAL CORRESPONDENTS Seth Borenstein Health & Technical Issues Robert S. Boyd Science & Technology Drew Brown Pentagon and the Military Sumana Chatterjee Congress Joseph L. Galloway Military Affairs Ron Hutcheson White House William Douglas White House Jim Kuhnhenn Congress

Jonathan S. Landay National Security Subject: RE: KnightRidder Washington Bureau, Joe Galloway, We Were Soldiers FICTION Date: 1/7/2004 2:50:14 PM Pacific Standard Time From: jlanday@krwashington.com Reply To: To: LZXRAY111765@aol.com

Please dont send me your rubbish anymore. thx

-----Original Message----- From: LZXRAY111765@aol.com [mailto:LZXRAY111765@aol.com] Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2004 5:46 PM To: jlanday@krwashington.com Subject: KnightRidder Washington Bureau, Joe Galloway, We Were Soldiers FICTION

JONATHAN S. LANDAY National Security and Intelligence Jonathan S. Landay, national security and intelligence correspondent, has written about foreign affairs and U.S. defense, intelligence and foreign policies for 15 years. From 1985-94, he covered South Asia and the Balkans for United Press International and then the Christian Science Monitor. He moved to Washington in December 1994 to cover defense and foreign affairs for the Christian Science Monitor and joined Knight Ridder in October 1999. He speaks frequently on national security matters, particularly the Balkans.

E-mail Jonathan at jlanday@krwashington.com

Shannon McCaffrey Justice Ken Moritsugu National Economics Tony Pugh Consumer Economics Warren P. Strobel Foreign Affairs & the State Department Steven Thomma Politics Alison Young Investigative Stephen Henderson Supreme Court Chris Adams Investigative FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS Kevin G. Hall South America Susana Hayward Mexico Mark McDonald Moscow Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson Middle East Sudarsan Raghavan Africa Tim Johnson China Hannah Allam Iraq

BY JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY never served in the military

KnightRidder's Military Consultant.

This is suppose to be an Air Assault.

What is missing from this Operation Order

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Copy Nr_________ Hqs,1st Bn, 7thCav Plei Me, RVN ZA 168069 140845 Nov 65

Written transcript of Oral Operations Order issued by Lieutenant Colonel

Harold G. Moore, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 140845

November 1965.

1. SITUATION:

A. Enemy

( 1 ) Possible Battalion vicinity YA 903032.

( 2 ) Possible enemy on Chu Pong Mounatin YA 935010.

( 3 ) Possible secret base vicinity YA 960020

B. 3rd Brigade continues present mission of search and destroy

South and West of Pleiku, Plei Me with 2/7 Cavalary South of

Plei Me and 2/5 Cavalary West of Plei Me.

2. MISSION: 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry conducts Air assault operations

in area LIME ( Ia Drang Valley ) to search for and destroy

the enemy.

Operations will be concentrated on stream beds,

river beds, and wooded high ground to a maximum height of

500 meters.

3. EXECUTION:

A. Concept of Operation:

(1) Maneuver:

The battalion will enter the area of operations by company elements shuttling

from their present locations using 16 UH1D helicopters landing at Landing

Zone X-RAY.

Alternate Landing Zones are TANGO and YANKEE to be used only

on order.

Company B will land first and secure the Landing Zone.

The Landing Zone will be secured using the technique of sending out

reconnaissance elements from one platoon and retaining the company

( - ) assembled as a striking force.

Company A, Company C, and Company D will follow on order.

Company B and Company A on order will assemble in attack formation off

North and Northwest portion of the landing zone prepared to commence a

coordinated searching movement to the East and Northeast on order

with Company A on the right ( East ).

Company C initially Battalion reserve and Landing Zone security on order.

Prepare to move West and Northeast to search lower portion of mountian

area vicinity X-RAY.

(2) Fire Support:

There will be an 8 minute diversionary artillery preparation vicinity Landing

Zone YANKEE and TANGO, followed by a 20 minute tube artillery

preparation vicinity the primary Landing Zone X-RAY with emphasis on

surrounding terrain and the finger and draw Northwest of X-RAY.

FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY

TAB C

For Official Use Only

The tube artillery will be followed by 30 seconds of Aerial Rocket Artillery followed by 30 seconds of gunship preparation just prior to touchdown of the assault company. All mortars under Company D mortar platoon control. Position area to be selected after landing. Priority of fires initially to Company B then to Company A when move off the LZ begins.

B. Company A:

C. Company B:

D. Company C:

E. Company D:

F. Headquarters Company: Move to Landing Zone on order utilizing 2 CH-47's.

G. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Each rifle company be prepared to assume mission of any other rifle company on order.

(2) "C" lift frequency will be used for move.

(3) All rifle companies take one mortar and maximum ammunition.

(4) All mortars will be brought in as internal UH1D loads and placed under Company D control.

4. ADMINSTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

A. No mules will be taken into objective area until cleared to do so by the Battalion Commander.

B. Forward Supply point will be at Landing Zone Falcon ZA 022032.

C. Equipment left at Plei Me will be placed inside the Special Forces Camp prepared for air move to Landing Zone Falcon or X-Ray on order.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

A. Battalion Commander initially will assult company.

B. Battalion Forward Command Post: Landing Zone X-Ray at Battalion Commander's location.

C. Battalion Rear Command Posr: Present location initially. Landing Zone Falcon on order.

MOORE Lt Colonel

OFFICIAL:

DILLION S-3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTALION, 7TH CAVALARY 1ST CAVALARY DIVSION (AIRMOBILE) APO San Francisco, California 96490

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 9 December 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report, IA DRANG Valley Operation 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry 14-16 November 1965

To: Commanding Officer 3d Brigade 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) APO Us Forces 96490

I. GENERAL:

During this operation, I was the Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry. On 23 November 1965, I was promoted and turned over the battalion to my successor.

II. BACKGROUND:

A. On 10 November the battalion moved from the base camp at An Khe, coordinates BR476476, by CV-2 to a forward airstrip and assembly area south of Pleiku, coordinates ZA198340. From there, all companies were shuttled the same day by UH-1D into a search and destroy operation in an area to the east of Plei me, vicinity coordinates ZA2007 to ZA7606. We conducted satuaration patrolling through the 12th with light contact by only Company A. We also conducted a civic action program supplying medical aid and USOM food to Montagnard village, population 200, coordinates ZA237073. On the 12th, the Assistant Division Commander-A, during a visit to the battalion, indicated to the Brigade Commander that he had no objection to the latter sending a battalion into the IA DRANG Valley. This we took as an alert and began a map study. On 13 November, the battalion was moved on brigade orders to a new area of operations south and southwest of Plei Me. Once again saturation patrolling was conducted out of company bases throughout the day with no contact. Company B was airlifted after 1500 hours into the Brigade CP area as security, and for an immediate reaction force under Brigade control. It closed into position by 1800 hours.

B. At approximately 1700 hours, the Brigade Commander and I visited the Company A CP south of Plei Me. During a visit, the Brigade Commander gave me orders to execute an assault by helicopter into the IA DRANG Valley, north of CHU PONG Mountain early the next morning with a mission of conducting search and destroy operations through the 15th. The area of operations was pointed out on the map and he informed me that we would be supported from LZ FALCON, coordinates ZA023032, by two batteries of 105mm howitzer artillery-one of which would be moved by air from PLEI ME early on the 14th prior to our assault.

C. I returned to my CP near Plei Me; formulated a tentative plan; issued instructions to my staff; procured further details from 3d Brigade Headquarters and the supporting helicopter unit; and issued a warning order to my unit commanders, staff, and supporting elements. By 2200 hours, 13 November, all preparations had been accomplished which were possible without an actual air reconnaissance. Arrangements included an early morning airlift of Company B back to PLEI ME: directions to the commanders of A and C Companies to concentrate their elements first light in the largest pick-up zone(s) in their respective sectors; and plans for a first light air recon by all key commanders and staff officers. A time of 0830 hours was set for issuance at my CP of the operation order.

D. At this time, the "fighting" strength of my lettered companies as they wenr into the operation was as follows:

NUMBER COMMITTED TO OPERATION TO&E

Officers Men Officers Men

CoA 5 115 6 164 CoB 5 114 6 164 CoC 6 106 6 164 CoD 4 76 5 118

The shortages were primarilly due to malaria and ETS discharges. Each company also had 3-5 men at base camp at An Khe as guards, sick, administrative retention, and base camp area development workers. There were 8-10 men on R and R or absent going back to prepare for R and R.

III. OPERATIONS ON 14 NOVEMBER:

A. THE AIR RECON AND RESULTS:

(1) 14 November dawned bright and clear. Shortly after first light at 0630 hours, Company B was returned to battalion control at Plei Me and began making final preparations for its role as the assault company. The Chinooks which had carried B company back were commencing to move Battery A, 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery to LZ FALCON as planned. The air recon party had assembled as after a brief orientation on the purpose of the recon, flight route, and item to look for, we took of in two UH-1Ds escorted by two gun ships. The flight route is shown on the attached sketch (Tab A). We made one south to north pass at about 4500 feet actual; flew north past Duo Co, coordinates YA845255, orbited five minutes, then flew south generally over the same route and at the same attitude, and returned to Plei Me. The air recon party included the Battalion Commander; S-3; Battalion, Artillery Liaison Officer; Commanding Officer, Battery A, 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery; Commanding Officer B Company (Assault Company); Scout Section Leader, Troop O, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry; and the Commanding Officer, Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion (Avn Co, 7th Special Forces, 1st Special Forces Group).

(2) During the air recon, several open areas were selected by member of the recon party as possible landing zones in and around the IA DRANG Valley. Upon return from the recon at about 0815 hours, we received a written Frag Order from Brigade which specifically defined the area of operations. The area is shown on the attached map (Tab B). I then received comments as to the LZ to be used. Three possibilites fell out of this discussion-LZ's TANGO, X-RAY, and YANKEE (See Tab B). TANGO was discarded as the primary LZ for being to tight, e.g. a "well"- type LZ with tall trees around it, and for being to small-capacity of three to four UH-1Ds. It was agreed that X-RAY and YANKEE could both probably accommodate eight UH-1Ds at one landing. I tentatively decided on LZ X-RAY and prepared to issue my operation order based on that selection. Concurrently I dispatched the Cavalry Scout Section for a low-level flight up the IA DRANG Valley area to gain detailed information on X-RAY, YANKEE, the surrounding terrain, and to look for signs of enemy activity. The Cavalry Section returned in approximately 40 minutes with information that YANKEE

We Were Soldiers Once and Young is Fiction only to X-Ray.

The Reinfoecements Bco.2/7, 2/7 Battalion, 2/5 Battalion's stories can't be disputed.

NADAL, LT. COL. MOORE'S A COMPANY COMMANDER AT Landing Zone X-RAY, HAS NOW STATED THAT LT. COL. MOORE was conducting

A "RECONAISSANCE IN FORCE."

THIS NOW CHANGES THING's IN THE TATICS PART

FM 100-5 page 9-2

Commanders must be prepared to conduct, a Reconnaissance in force

a special purpose operation,

A reconnaissance in force is a limited-objective operation by a considerable force that obtains information and locates and tests enemy dispositions, strengths, and reactions.

Even when the commander is executing a reconnaissance in force primarily to "gather information,"

he must be alert to seize any opportunity to exploit tactical success.

The enemy's reaction my reveal major weaknesses in his defensive system. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Becouse a "reconnaissance in force" is primarily an "information-gathering operation," commanders must carefully assess all "risks!!" involved.

commanders must make 'advance' provisions either to "extricate" the force or to exploit success. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ FM 7-20 A reconnaissance in force is and attack to discover thre enemy's position and strength.

"Although its primary aim is Reconnaissance",

it may discover weakness in the enemy dispositions which, if promptly exploted, may acheive tataical success.

the Battalion may conduct the reconnaissance in force for the Brigade.

Elements of the Battalion may also conduct a reconnaissance in force on a limited scale.

Planning the reconnaissance in force is employed to develope enemy information rapidly;

however, IN TERMS OF COMBAT POWER REQUIRED,

IT IS AN "EXPENSIVE" METHOD OF GAINING INTELLIGENCE.

In arriving at a decision to reconnoiter in force, the commander considers the following

extent of his present knowledge of the enemy situation and the urgency and importance of the additional information sought.

THE RISK THAT THE RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE MAY BE "DEFEATED" AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT

THE RECONNAISSANCE MAY LEAD TO A "GENERAL ENGAGEMENT UNDER UNFAVARABLE CONDITIONS".

THE EFFECT THE LOSS OF THE RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE WOULD HAVE ON SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS

CONDUCT "RESTRICTIONS" ARE NORMALLY PLACED ON THE COMMANDER OF THE FORCE TO AVOID "DECISIVE BATTLE."

THE COMMANDER ORDERING THE RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE IS ALSO PREPARED TO ASSIST IN THE "EXTRACTION" OF THE FORCE IF IT BECOMES HEAVILY ENGAGED.

It leads to these facts Lt. Col. Moore made a reconnaissance in force "WITH OUT ANY REINFORCEMENTS" to back him up,or any way to extract when once they found the enemy.

He then committed them TO "A GENERAL ENGAGEMENT UNDER UNFAVARABLE CONDITIONS".

Lt. Col Moore then had to call for reinforcements, the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry, which then lead to the 2/7's walk to Landing Zone Albany you now can see how "EXPENSIVE" it was to the 1st Cavalry Division as the Division Commander Kinnard had to use the whole of the division resorces to keep Lt. Col. Moore from losing Landing Zone X-Ray.

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We Were Soldiers Once...and Young : Ia Drang : The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam

by Harold G. Moore, Joseph Galloway (Contributor)

3 of 3 people found the following review helpful: Company Commander at X-Ray, March 20, 2001 Reviewer: Ramon A. nadal from Williamsburg, VA I commanded A Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Cav under LTC Hal Moore at X-Ray. I lived the battle and led two aasaults. Hal Moore's book is an accurate account of the events of those two days and

reflects his love for his soldiers ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ LOVE FOR HIS SOLDIERS?

Lt. Col. Moore was suppose to lay on water and a MedEvac Huey "BUT DIDNT"

I ask Bco's 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal "why didnt Lt. Col. Moore lay on water for his men ( B co would be on the LZ for over 4 hours ) and why he said it was not the slick crew's job to haul out Wounded Troops?"

Bco's 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal "Dont ask me I knew nothing about Airmobile tatics."

Page 106 Lt. Col. Moore we needed water

Page 107 Bco 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal by 3pm we ran out of water, the wounded kept begging for water.

Page 145 November 15, 1965 at 6:20am Jemison shared his last drops of water.

Page 112 November 14, 1965 While all day long the Battalion Supply Officer was riding in and out of X-Ray & Joseph L Galloway came. 240# of water, medical not comming in each lift.

the sad part 1 Wounded troop was not going out. ( Like Lt Franklin who was terribly wounded in the chest and was set aside to die.)

Page 106 Lt. Col. Moore "hauling out wounded was not the slick crews job" ( Aviation ) "this statement is from a Pilot'" was the Army unionized?

FM 7-20 Hauling wounded is the secoundary mission of all Army military aircraft.

FM 7-20 Page 271 paragraph 313 returning supporting/ organic aircraft may be used for the evacuation of casualities.

Crandall to Moore I'm sorry but hauling wounded is not my unit's "JOB" call medevac

NOTE the medevc Huey at this time was like an ambulance it carried a Doctor or a senoir medic and the neccery equipement to save a wounded troop, This is why they werent about to set down in a hot Landing Zone.

Page 63 BUT Lt. Col. Moore used his command Huey to haul out a non wounded PAVN pow ( this was one of Crandalls job )

Page 167 but "NONE" Lt. COL. Moores wounded troops, Lt Franklin terribly wounded in the chest was set aside to die. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ as well as his determination to close with the enemy. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ CLOSE WITH THE ENEMY When Herrick Attacked the enemy Moore was Pissed, Moore was the one who sent them to develope the situation. In the 1st story written by Galloway Lt. Col. Moore was proud that the enemy stated that moore's men ( Herrick platoon ) kept moving foward when they were hit. but Lt. Col. Moore now has decided Herrick was careless and to anxious to encounter the enemy. Just like him self,

Moore had told Col. Brown he wasnt leaving Landing Zone X-Ray untill his whole Battalion had Closed on X-Ray 25 minutes later he was sending B company up the mountain to develope the situation, when he should have been setting up his defences at X-Ray, He was supposed to set up his defences when he first landed. There is a defencive phase in an Air Assault +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ As another reviewer described the book shortly after it was published it is "the best description of small unit combat since the Red badge of Courage".

- Neil Sheehan, author of A Bright Shining Lie "A stunning achievement - paper and words with the permanence of marble. I read it and thought of The Red Badge of Courage, the highest compliment I can think of."

Neil also wrote as he landed at Landing Zone X-Ray " The Huey plummeted, and the pilots dashed over the trees to minimize exposure, "THROWING THE ROTORS ( blades )INTO REVERSE" we breaked like a parachute popping open.

Having just read 71 reviews I note that some of the reviewers criticize Moore on issues of tactical considerations. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ TATICAL CONCIDERATIONS Conducting a reconnaissance in force with out reinforcements and no plans to extract the force if the found the enemy

not setting up his defence perimerter when he first landed as required by airmobile tatics

Taking his M-60 machineguns off the perimeter and putting them in the dead pile when the crew was wounded or killed

I'll bet the C company commander would have liked to have had a few of the "EXTRA" "SPARE" machineguns in his sector, C company was Moores unit that was overran, how many of C company's machineguns were in the dead pile, and became spare? but with Custers luck the enemy stopped to strip off all the american weapons and then retreated.

in the D company sector which was only 75 meters long, Lt. Col. Moore put 9 or more M-60 Machineguns in that 75 meters, a machinegun every 8 meters with a crew of 4 troops per machinegun and 6,000 rounds of ammo per machinegun, thats 7 1/2 cases of ammo, each case has 4 containers of 200 rounds each total 800 rounds, a total of 30 containers, thats 60,100 round belts of ammo. the weight of each case is about 80 pounds, for a total weight of about 600 pounds.

For comparesion the UH-1B Gunship had 4 M-60 machineguns and 6,000 rounds was the basic load for the 4 machineguns.

the C company commander told Moore he was about to be overran and to send reinforcements, Moore said no,

Lt. Col. Moore then sent his reserve platoon to the 'D' company sector. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Without going into a lot of detail the Hueys did well to carry 6 soldiers at the altitude of the central highlands of Vietnam. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ HUEYs DID WELL TO CARRY 6 soldiers These are statements made by Lt. Col. Moore and the Huey Pilots and the rear area operation Officer

Page 40 Lt. Col. Moore "later lifts could carry more men 100 as fuel burned off".

Page 198 Rear area Operation Officer Dick Merchant "the Huey could carry 10 men"

Page 111 Paul Winkel "I had a total of 16 men in my Huey".

Fournier "it was left up to each pilot how many men he carried" on later lifts I was carring 9-12 troops

this is during the heat of the day where the temptures reached 103 degrees

so dont tell me a Huey couldnt carry 10 troops +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ We did not have good intelligence as to where the enemy was

so the operation was planned as a reconaissance in force.

Not much different than hundreds of other air assaults by both Army and Marine units during the war. The book was not written to glorify war but to demonmstrate the courage and character of the American soldier.

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Subj: Re: Lz_Xray_Comments Date: 4/2/01 5:41:20 PM Pacific Daylight Time From: stevmoor2@hotmail.com (Stephen Moore) To: Lzalbany65@aol.com

Russell -

I have read all the notes you have sent me and I really do want to understand why you are so bitter about this whole affair.

It seems to boil down to a few key points:

- the characterization of Albany as an Ambush instead of a Meeting Engagement

- the fact that the 2nd Bn had to walk to Albany instead of flying out; resulting in the horror that you had to live thru as part of the recon platoon.

The first is really a matter of semantics and interpretation - so either description is in the eye of the beholder. Let it go.

The second point is really not something that Hal Moore had under his control. In fact, I seem to remember a passage in the book where he laments the fact that 2/7 had to walk out and wonders what the hundreds of helicopters in the division were doing that was more important than getting you guys out. But again, nothing now will change that; and, again, Hal was not the commander / decision maker that issued the orders to either 2/7 or the helicopter units. So, again, let it go.

That said, I am amazed that you do not see the real purpose of this book - to honor the men, like yourself, who fought in a terrible battle, sacrificed greatly, and were not accorded the proper respect upon return home.

After all, it was this book that put the Ia Drang on the map. When you meet other Vietnam Vets and mention that you were there, they KNOW what you went thru and the horrors you saw and experienced. That statement can be extended to a large number of Americans who also read the book or watched the TV coverage.

I would think you would be proud that this battle is part of the documented history of the war. Nobody can look down their nose at you or your fellow 2/7 CAV troopers - instead, it is the opposite - as a result of this book, you enjoy the respect you deserve. Think of the thousands of men who fought hellish, close but nameless actions - you have this book to anchor and document your war for your friends and children - they have nothing.

But maybe you are too close to the events and can't step back and see the bigger picture.

Now, that said, anyone in the Military can learn from others - what they did right and what they did wrong - and you can read any number of papers written on what went right and what went wrong in this battle. Mistakes by a wide variety of the people were made and have been acknowledged in various forums. Nobody is or was perfect. But it is history.

Anyway, I do want to take this opportunity to express my thanks to you and your Vietnam peers for what you went thru for the rest of us. Even though I served in the Army for 20 years, my contributions pale next to what you, the 1/7 and 2/7 went thru during those few days of November 35 years ago.

Take care and thanks!

COPY RIGHT 1991

Landing Zone ALBANY

17-18 November 1965

Vietnam

Landing Zone Albany was nether a Ambush or a Massacure or covered up by the Army. AS STATED BY LT. COL. HAROLD G. MOORE, JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY and Forrest Sawyer of ABC NEWS from the Video They Were Young and Brave

Before I get into my own personal account of Landing Zone Albany, I need to share with you the reader, some facts about air mobile war tactics as well as physical facts about the equipment we had to use at this point in the conflict in Vietnam. I need to share and clarify this information, since I have found in my research for developing this web site, that other authors/reporters have given out extraordinarily misleading information to the public. Whether it is a result of the inadequate knowledge of equipment, tactics or personal opinion sneaking in as 'fact', I feel these corrections and clarifications are important for you to truly understand the issues surrounding these truly historically pivotal events. That stated, let me begin.

By SP/4 Russell L. Ross

RA17630469 D company 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry Recon Platoon ( LoneRanger call sign ) 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile An Khe Vietnam

B company 1st Battalion 511 Infantry ( Airborne ) 11 Air Assualt ( test ) FT. Benning, Georgia

B company 1/511 became B company 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry ( Airborne ) 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile FT. Benning, Georgia.

And I was sent to the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile

HOW LANDING ZONE ALBANY CAME TO BE

PART FICTION WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE AND YOUNG X-RAY PART Page references are from We Were Soldiers Once and Young Hardback

Page 17 In 1957 for 2 1/2 years, Lt. Col. Moore was in on the birth of the concept of Airmobility.

The one Man Airborne branch in Air Mobility Division and worked for General Jim Gavin, Colonel John Norton, Colonel Philp Seneff, and Colonel Bob Williams.

Who were all considered to be the fathers of Airmobility

In 1964 for 1 year 6 months in the 11 Air Assault ( Test )

Lt. Col. Moore has accumulated 4 years in Air Assault Tatics.

Sky Soldiers From "The New Face of War" by Time Life Books

Chapter 2 "Winged Mounts for the U.S. Cavalry"

Page 37 Lietutenant General Harold G. Moore.

"In 1963 Kinnard began bulding his airmobilty test unit."

"TRAINING TEXT DID NOT EXIST, AND THERE WERE NO STANDARD OPERATIONAL TECHNEQUES."

The Division had to work out methods of communication, Modes of formation flying.

Countless other basics- how to lash down cargo, how to disperse at a landing Zone, HOW TO RAPPEL BY ROPE FROM A HELICOPTER TO THE GROUND."

No where in his book does Lt.Col. Moore write about his unit the 2nd Battalion 23 Infantry of the 2nd Infantry Division, That was attached to the 11 Air Assault Division,

Doing any of these things.

But he does write about Infantry troops that were given minimum training, With Helicopters used as transport.

"TRAINING TEXT DID NOT EXIST, AND THERE WERE NO STANDARD OPERATIONAL TECHNEQUES."

THIS STATEMENT ALONE SHOWS LT. COL. HAROLD G. MOORE HAD NO IDEA WHAT HE WAS DOING WHEN HE WENT BLUNDERING INTO LANDING ZONE X-RAY NOVEMBER THE 14,1965 IN THE PLEIKU PROVENCE OF VIETNAM.

This is also why On November the 13,1965. He is under the delusion he has come up with a new Air Assault Tatic for the Assault echelon.

Lt. Col. Harold G. Moore Klink is the COL. KLINK of the war. HE KNEW NOTHING, NOTHING.

Leadership Principal 1

Keep abreast of current Military Devolopements

Page 41. Lt.Col. Moore "I had been thinking of a new technique, for the assault echelon."

Lt. Col. Moore under this delusion would blunder into Landing Zone X-Ray and in the processes, Would doom his men. For the want of a nail, The 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry.

The Battle of Landing Zone X-Ray would grind up, The Troops, Helicopters and Artillary.

Making them unavalible for other units.

Leading to the walk to Landing Zone Albany by the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry.

And of course the new technique. Was already written, By the people he worked with in 1957 and was in the Field Manuals of that time.

FM 57-35 Army Transport Aviation-Combat Operations

Lt. General John J. Tolson.

"The results of a few months of concentrated activity were climaxed with the publication of a new Field Manual ( Above ) The Basic Tatics and techniques described in this manual STOOD the test of time and would be vindicated in the test of the 11 Air Assault Division and in Vietnam."

1950's Field Manual 57-35 Army Transport Avation-Combat Operations. 1963 Field Manual 57-35 Airmobile Operations. 1965 Field Manual 7-20 Infantry, Airborne Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Battalions 1963 Field Manual 1-100 Army Aviation 1965 Field Manual 7-11 Rifle company Infantry, Airborne,and Mechanized 1962 Field Manual 7-15 Infantry,Airborne Infantry and Mechanized Infantry Rifle Platoons and Squads 1965 Field Manual 22-100 Military Leadership

Lt. Col. Moore, A West Pointer of 1945, Master Parachutist, and an Army Aviator. He had combat experience in Korea, A 14 month tour and had Commanded 2nd Infantry K company, and S-3 for the 17th Infantry Regiment, and later would serve as the assistant G-3 for the 7th Infantry Division, ( S-3 and G-3 are the same job )

In 1948 he served with Harry W.O. Kinnard and with the 3rd Brigade Commander Thomas W. Brown.

They ( Kinnard, Brown, Moore ) went to school together in 1951-1952 to an advance course of the Infantry school and had served together in the 7th Infantry Division 1952-1953 in the Korean War.

So was Lt. Col. Moore the most experinced Officer in Airmobile and Infantry tatics? Then any of the other Officers in the 11 Air Assault Division, Even after getting there in April 1964, 1 year after the 11 Air Assault came into being.

GEN. Knowles the division Excecutive Officer considered Lt. Col. Harold G. Moore the Battalion Commander who was.

What happend. It would appear Lt. Col. Moore would be the first one chosen by Kinnard for the 11 AIr Assault test, When it started up in 1963 but he wasnt, He had to write a letter to Major General Kinnard ( His Old Boss ) "begging" for a Infantry Battalion in the 11 air Assault Division.

It wasent till June 1964, 1 year after it started, He got the call. He didnt get one with the 11 Air Assault but instead was given a Infantry Battalion in the 2 infantry Division. The 2nd Battalion 23rd Infantry

FACT: The 2nd Battalion 23 Infantry was only ATTACHED to the 11 Air Assault.

Page 17 Lt Col. Moore "The 2nd Battalion 23rd Infantry was "detached" from the 2nd Infantry Division and then "assigned" to the 11 Air Assualt Division in 1964."

If they were assinged to the 11 Air Assault. Why did they wear their 11 Air Assault patch on their right shirt pocket, and not on the left shirt sleeve? The unit you were assinged to, You wore that patch on the left sleeve.

Was it becouse they wore the 2nd Infantry Division Patch there?

They were "Attached" to the 11 Air Assault. According to the Military's defination

Attachents: Is the placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is ("Relatively Temporary") Subject to limitations imposed by the attachment order, The commander of formation, unit, or organization receiving the attachment will exercise the same degree of command and control over it as he does over units and persons organic to his command. However, The responsibility for transfer and promotion of personnel normally will be retained by the parent formation, unit or organization.

ASSINGMENT: Is the placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is ( "Relativley Permanent" ) and / or where such oraganization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the function, of the unit or personnel.

Lt. Col. Moore, Had never commanded a Infantry Battalion before.

page 207 But one of the hand picked officers by Kinnard in 1963 was Lt. Col McDade,

He was chosen for the G-1 spot,

He would be given command of the 2nd Battilion 7th Cavalry around November 7,1965 some say 3 weeks, By General Kannard, Aproximately 10 days before the battle of Landing Zone Albany.

Lt. Col. McDade, Had never Commanded a Infantry Battalion before.

THERE WAS ANOTHER FACTOR, Lt. COL. MOORE AND Lt. COL. McDADE WERE HAVING A POWER STRUGGLE.

Guess who had the cards stacked in his favor.

THIS CLIQUE ( Gen. KNOWLES, Col. BROWN AND Lt. Col. Moore ) WOULD EXCLUDE Lt. Col. McDADE DURING THE CRITIAL BREIFINGS OF THE IA DRANG VALLEY.

On November 9,1965 Col. Brown and "only" Lt. Col. Moore go to a breifing on the enemy situation in the Ia Drang Valley.

ABSENT from this breifing Lt. Col. McDade

After the Battle of Landing Zone X-Ray.

November 16,1965 Brigadeier General Richard Knowles, Lt. Col. John Stoner Division Air Liaison Officer, Discuss with Lt. Col. Tully Commander of the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry, The route his unit the 2nd battalion 5 Cavalry will take the next day when they leave Landing Zone X-Ray.

ABSENT from this breifing Lt. Col. McDade

Two units were walking out of Landing Zone X-Ray the next Day. Tully's 2/5 and Lt. Col. McDade's 2/7.

Lt. Col. McDade is breifed seperatly, alone by Brigadier General Knowles, Knowles Did not care for or like Lt. Col. McDade. page 33 Col. Brown and Lt. Col. Moore seemed to be together all the time, "unseperatable".

on november the 12,1965 they were together when Knowles was looking for Brown and gave the go for the Ia Drang, Moore write Knowles gave "US" the go and Moore then started his staff planning for an operation he may or may not get.

General Knowles did not like or care for Lt. Col McDade, He had wanted some one else for the Command of 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry. and was pissed off when McDade got it.

He wanted McDade gone.

What is worse

A Man Lt. Col . Moore, Who was in on the concept of Airmobility, Help write Air Assault Tatics for 2 1/2 years?

Plus he had 1 1/2 years commanding an Infantry Battalion, A Battalion in a Elite Division Trained explicedly in and for Airmobile Operations.

For a total of 4 years in Airmobile tatics

The first battle he is involved in, in Vietnam, The Battle of Landing Zone X-Ray, An Airmobile Operation.

He states he was rewriting Airmobile tatics, As he had come up with a new Technique for the 1st Lift ( The Assault Echelon )

A tatic he should have learned, that was already written in Manuals of that time. FM 57-35 Airmobile Operations.

He knew all the troops in His Battalion.

His Officers and NCO help train the troops in AirAssault tatics

He Lead his troops in their first battle.

And still didnt know what he was doing.

Lt. Col. Moores Troops were all Combat trained his unit in the field had no administration personnal, ie cook, chapln, clerks, supply clerks with them.

You have Lt. Col Harold G. Moore ( COL. KLINK )

Or a man given command of a Battalion ( DURING COMBAT? ) Lt. Col. McDade

With only 10 days of Battalion Command experence, His unit the 2/7 is pieced together from units all over the States with no Air Assault training according to Moore.

What they did have was good solid Infanrty training and tatics

Page 207 Given an XO Major Frank Henry, Who's job, He thinks is, To keep Lt. Col. McDade out of trouble till he got his feet wet.

He dosent know his troops, His 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry, Is then split up to reinforce Lt. Col. Moores 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry at Landing Zone X-Ray.

Who's Commander didnt know what he was doing Lt. Col. Moore, He thought he was rewriting Air Assault tatics and had to call for reinforcements.

He becouse of X-Ray and the need for reinforcements he bringes the whole of his Battallion, combat troops and his admimistration personnel ie the cooks, chapln, clerks, supply clerks anyone who could carry a weapon with them.

His unit the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry is then reinforced with another unit A company from the 1st Battalion 5th Cavalry,

Who's men he didnt know,

Who's Commander Capt. George Forrest< Thought his unit A company 1st Battalion 5th Cavalry was getting a raw deal, As his unit had to be in the rear of the column, ( Perhaps Forrest would have liked to have been in C company's position in the column )

Becouse they were attached, and attached units get the worst jobs?

In what could be classified as a "Forced march,"

He had to have his unit the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry 3 miles away in 3 hours.

His unit had to follow another Battalion the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry. Through jungle, That it usually took 1 hour to go 200 yards in,

Strange, That if the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry did have 2 company's abreast, and put out flank guards, How were they able to move that fast through the jungle? how did the flank guards keep up with the main column?

Lt. Col. Moore's B company was in this formation when they went up the mountain and only went a 100 yards before the formation disentregrated to a column.

No one moves at the same speed in a column formation, You have diffrent paths, terrain and obsticles to go around. The column like an accordion alternately lengthens and shortens, any change in the pace at the head of the column by the time it gets to the rear of the column, it gets maganified.

The 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry didnt carry the same equipement as the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry did. The 2/7 had it's mortars, Equipement left by the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry.

The ability of an infantry soldier to fight is directly related to the load he is required to carry.

Excessive loads cost soldiers their energy and agility.

Soldiers carrying excessive loads are at a disadvantage when they must react to enemy contact.

Also, the rate of march is affected adversely by excessive soldier load.

Physical training does not compensate for overloading.

The 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry didnt, The column can only move as fast as the most heavily loaded element.

This would leave the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry still been in the Danger area of Landing Zone X-Ray, When the B-52's bombed Landing Zone X-Ray.

While he is reorganizing his unit for a perimeter defence at the new location, Landing Zone Albany

They have a meeting engagement with the enemy who were on the way to attack another unit.

The ability of an infantry soldier to fight is directly related to the load he is required to carry.

Excessive loads cost soldiers their energy and agility.

Soldiers carrying excessive loads are at a disadvantage when they must react to enemy contact.

Physical training does not compensate for overloading.

But the 2/7 over came this, the troops reacted to this contact, The training they had recived payed off, the enemy payed the price.

At Landing Zone Albany 75% of the enemy killed was by rifle and machine gun fire only 25% were killed by Artillary and Tac Air. 268 weapons were taken

At Landing Zone X-Ray these figures were reversed

25% were killed by Rifle and machinegun fire and 75% were by Artillary and Tac Air 241 weapons were taken

From Delta Forces by Col. Charlie A Beckwith,USA (Ret) and Donald Knox

Strange Beckwith of Delta Forces lead's two company's in "A SINGLE FILE" to get to the Plei Me camp, when it was surrounded by the PAVN. in October.

Page 65 Beckwith "We continued to move through the jungle in a single file. The column streched out.

Lt. Col. McDade then gets crucified for having his Battalion in a column formation. Which was appropriate formation for the terrain the Battalion was moving through.

Moore gives the enemy get credit for stopping the column when the column has all ready stopped?

Re: The Movie "We Were Soldiers"

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Last changed: October 10, 2004